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CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC WARFARE AS A PRIMARY POLICY DEVICE
INTRODUCTION

This Chapter illustrates economic warfare used "offensively" as
a primary policy instrument. Major reliance is placed upon economic warfare in Situations 5 and 6 to attain policy goals. The
offensive role of economic warfare in S1~tuation 5 is to interrupt
supply by one of our allies of · insurgents in another state. The
employment of intense forms of violence for this purpose is inadmissible because a basis for friendship of the target of economic
action must be retained.
The offensive role of economic warfare in Situation 6 is to counter
and upset a planned attack upon the United States with biological
·weapons. In Situation 6 naval and other military force is deployed
to "quarantine" or "interdict" biological munitions and the means
for their deli very.
Situation 5 concentrates upon basic elements of the "economic
sortie." Difficulties in manipulating foreign aid as an economic
warfare measure are illustrated. National and international comInodity controls are discussed and suggestions offered how economic
sorties can be developed within the legal structure established for
commodity trade and control.
Situation 6 illustrates "economic sortie'~ techniques using naval
force in offensive economic warfare. Self-Defense and Collective
Self-Defense arguments under Article 51 are examined and a scheme
suggested for a standard of permissive coercive action in view of
Articles 2 ( 4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter.
The reader will find it helpful to review the discussion of "intervention" in Situation 3, Chapter III. The analysis of permissive
coercion suggested is framed in the broader standard of permissive
intervention developed in Chapter III.
Situation 6 contains a discussion of legal problems in the Cuban
Quarantine of 1962. Selected comments upon legal features of the
Quarantine are analyzed and discussed.
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A. PLANNING THE ECONOMIC SORTIE: CONSIDERATIONS
OF LEGAL STRATEGY
Situation 5

Twelve hours after delivery of the N uevan ultimatum to the
Antiokan foreign secretary, Nuevan intelligence officers report withdrawal of the Antiokan marines from the south west coast of Nueva.
The marines have been replaced by PDS units. These units are now
removing supplies from the beaches and have landed other supplies
from unidentified surface vessels, submarines or aircraft.
Supplies identified as Antiokan are food, medical supplies and
equipment, and small arms ammunition. Containers of small arms,
antitank and antipersonnel mines, and light artillery ammunition
have been observed. There are a number of uncrated light antiaircraft missiles. These missiles bear ordnance markings of the Peoples
Republic of Scythia. No Scythian surface vessels, submarines or
aircraft in the area have been identified.
Our Minister to Nueva, now at his post, has persuaded Cortez to
request a meeting of the Organ of Consultation (Council of Foreign
Ministers) of the Organization of American States. Both Nueva and
Antioka are members of the Organization.
Cortez has declared, however, that Antioka must cease supplying
Salvaje or he will stop the supplies by force. He is gratified that
Antiokan marines have been withdrawn, is prepared to accept this
act as a partial response to his ultimatum, and will refrain from
military action for a short time to determine whether Antioka will
cease its "intervention."
The United States Minister reports Cortez is under heavy pressure by chauvinistic members of his cabinet to commence hostilities
against Antioka immediately. He believes Cortez is anxious to avoid
this diversion of his military strength. Both Cortez and the United
States Minister are alarmed by reports that persons wearing the
PDS armband but speaking Scythian are taking an active part in
arming and training PDS personnel in the Luna Mountains.
Our Minister has recommended to the Department of State that
action be taken to stop the flow of supplies from Antioka to Salvaje
pending consideration of the Nuevan complaint by the Organ of
Consultation of the OAS. While he acknowledges this may increase
reliance by Salvaje on Scythia, he believes it important to bring
Scythian support of Salvaje into the open as early as possible and
to force Salvaje to requisition food from farmers in the Luna
Mountain area. Since food supplies are short because of an extreme
drought, he thinks this will alienate the farmers from Salvaje and
favor the Cortez government.
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After receiving this recommendation from our Minister to Nueva,
the Department of State has instructed our Minister to Ant ioka to
discuss the Nuevan charge with Marshal Gondomar, President of
the Republic. Gondomar states if aid is being sent to Salvaje, this
aid supports the Monroe Doctrine since it encourages Salvaje not
to rely on aid from outside the I-Iemisphere.
In any event, the Marshal states, any aid Salvaje receives from
Antioka comes from private sources. He cannot interfere with these
because the Antiokan constitution, "one of the most liberal in the
world" provides for absolute freedom in domestic and foreign trade.
Our Antiokan Minister reports most of the supplies to Salvaje are
furnished by REVARMCO, an Antiokan corporation. Marshal
Gondomar and his two sons own 75% of the common stock. The
supplies are purchased by REVARMCO from Antiokan arsenals
and depots on credit. They are then sold to Salvaje for gold.
The Minister believes Gondomar can quickly bring this trade to
an end if he desires. Gondomar is regarded as friendly to the United
States and has usually supported the United States in debates in
the OAS.
You are commander of the United States Naval Base at Coloso,
Antioka. The United States Minister to Antioka is now meeting with
you and the heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force assistance
missions to Antioka. The Minister wishes to analyze the situation
and obtain your observations with a view to further talks with
Marshal Gondomar and his report to the State Department.
You and the other consultants are aware that under the International Peace and Security Act of 1961 1 the United States expended $10,000,000 in Antioka during the past fiscal year. It will
expend an equal amount during the current fiscal year. These
amounts include the cost of major items of military equipment, such
as tanks and ·antiaircraft guns, as well as the cost of spare parts,
maintenance and training of personnel.
A loan of $12,000,000 has been made from the Development Loan
Fund 2 to assist in the resettlement of workers, presently employed
in the tin mining and smelting industry, into agriculture and
various light industries. No development grants have been made £or
the current fiscal year, but a grant is under consideration for agricultural training in the public schools.
Tin concentrates and refined tin metal have been the major
Antiokan exports since colonial days. During the past ten years, the
1

75 Stat. 434 (1961).

2

Act tor International Development of 1961 section 201, 75 Stat. 424, ;126

(1961).
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United States has purchased approximately 60% of the total
Antiokan production of tin concentrates per annum.
About 40% of this total production has been purchased in dollars.
The remaining 20% has been obtained by barter pursuant to the
Commodity Credit Corporation Charter 3 and the Agricultural
Trade and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended. 4
Bolivia is the only other source of United States tin supply in
the Western Hemisphere. The United States domestic production of
tin concentrates is negligible; and tin is a strategic metal for which
there is no adequate substitute in the construction of heavy-duty
bearings.
The United States National or "strategic" stockpile now contains
341,000 long tons of tin ingot. Eight thousand long tons are in the
Commodity Credit Corporation "Pipeline" stockpile. These amounts
are 164,000 long tons in excess of projected strategic needs of the
United States. The Congress has therefore authorized disposition
of 50,000 long tons of tin ingot from the National stockpile.
None of this tin has been sold as of the time of the conference
with the Minister. However, the projected sale has generated much
publicity and has caused domestic and international concern among
those interested in the tin market. The President of the United
States has assured the President of Bolivia that tin dispositions
authorized by Congress will be made in a manner which will not
injure the Bolivian economy. 5 Similar assurances have not been
made to Marshal Gondomar.
Tin mining in An tioka is on a high -cost basis. The mines have
not been mechanized appreciably. The three mining corporations,
controlling 7i 0 ths of the Antiokan tin production, are controlled by
Marshal Gondomar and his two sons through majority stock ownership.
Antioka has purchased most of its wheat and wheat flour from
the United States and has bartered wheat for tin with the Commodity Credit Corporation. During the past year the United States
exported to Antioka 900,000 tons of wheat out of a total export of
12,066,000 tons. Antioka also looks to the United States for most
of its hard goods and textiles. Trade in these items amounted to
about $15,000,000 during the past year.

3 63 Stat. 154 (1949) section 2 amending section 4 (h) of the Commodity
Credit Corporation Charter Act. The original charter act contained no reference

to strategic and critical materials. 62 Stat. 1070 (1948).
4 68 Stat. 494 (1954) section 303; 72 Stat. 1791 (1958) section 6.
5 45 Department of State Bulletin, 772 (1961).
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Antioka is a party to the International Tin Agreement of 1960. 6
The United States is not a party. Both the United States and
Antioka are parties to the International Wheat Agreement o£ 1962.7
The United States, Antioka and Nueva are members of the Organization of American States and are parties to the various treaties
upon 'vhich this Organization is based. All are also parties to GATT
and members o£ the lJnited Nations Organization.
Our Minister to Antioka tells you he believes theN ational Security
Council may recommend to the President economic action to secure
cooperation by Marshal Gondomar in ending Antiokan aid to
Salvaje. Due to your extensive service in the area and familiarity
with Antiokan politics and econo1nic affairs, the 1\finister solicits
your recommendations concerning possible courses of action by the
United States to bring to an end Antiokan intervention in N uevan
internal affairs. The Minister is especially interested in economic
action, although other types of action will be considered during
your conference. What course or courses of economic action will you
recommend~

Discussion: Situation 5

I. Tentative Analysis of Facts and Possible Techniques
a. INTELLIGENOE BARRIER

The "intelligence barrier" is the major obstacle to be surmounted before an adequate plan of economic action can be formulated. The end to be sought is amply clear. The United States
desires Antioka to police the commercial transactions in which persons
within its territory play a part to insure trade with Salvaje ceases.
The end desired is a condition of "no contact." This requires positive action by Antiokan authorities. The overall strategy of the
· United States resembles a reconnaissance in force directed against
one enemy area to induce revelation of the enemy strength in
another area not under attack.
An effort is to be made to preserve peace between Antioka and
Nueva pending consideration of the N uevan complaint by the Organ
of Consultation of the Organization of American States. By the
time of this consideration, it is also expected the magnitude of
Scythian aid to ·Salvaje will be revealed.
None of these things can be accomplished with the speed and
See United States Tin Conference, 1960, &ummary of Proceedings, EjCONF.
32;5, p. 25 et seq.
7 TI.AS 5115 (1962).
6
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finesse required to avoid a major disturbance o£ relations between
Antioka and the United States unless United States policy makers
know precisely: ( 1) 'v ho can make the decisions in Antioka required to produce and sustain the desired condition of "no contact"
with Salvaje; and (2) the values to which these decision makers
are likely to respond.

b. SELECTING TIIE lVEALTH WEAPON
Once these facts are known, and our intelligence at this stage
indicates Marshal Gondomar as the official who can make the basic
"guideline" or "directory" decision to interrupt the contact with
Salvaje through his control over his sons and REVARMCO, 've
will probably employ the technique described earlier in this book as
an "economic sortie."
Although we are relatively sure economic warfare by "protracted
harassment" will not be attempted, it is possible a wealth weapon
will not be used. There is evidence Gondomar responds significantly
to manipulations o£ the wealth value (he likes money); but we
cannot be certain upon the information we now have about the form
this response is likely to take.
Will he resist or will he accept our demand? This we cannot
determine with any acceptable accuracy until we know more about
Marshal Gondomar-his history, his current control over his political
following, the other values at stake as Marshall Gondomar probably
views them.
Before, during and after our economic sortie, 've must depend
upon a constant and accurate flow of intelligence. Without this flow
and a reasonable expectation of its continuance, a wealth weapon
should not be used because o£ the chance of catastrophic misdirection.
Assuming 've can rely upon the £acts we have-and obtain additional facts-our problem is to induce in Marshal Gondomar
psychical disequilibrium or "a sense of being trapped." He must
£eel he has no alternative but to accept our demand.
This 've will do by bringing clearly before the Marshal the decision
we desire and indicating the probable points o£ our operations
against his economic position. We will then proceed rapidly in our
operations against the point at which he apprehends major injury
and £eels least able to defend.
It is not what he can do, but what he think~s he can do that counts
in economic warfare by economic sortie. We must thus take full
advantage of any existing apprehensions o£ detriment with which
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the Marshal is troubled. These apprehensions should indicate the
most remunerative points of attack.
It is not the shock of the unexpected which produces disequilibrium, as in applications of military force, but the rapid development of an anticipated event which enhances the intuitive pessimism
of the individual concerned. The point demanded is conceded by the
target upon the assumption that by doing this he can stabilize his
position. The "intermediate" object in both economic and military
'varfare is a "psychological condition" of a critical decision maker.
The ultimate object is acceptance of the victor's demand.
Four areas of possible economic action appear in the facts before
the Conference:
(1) The military and general economic aid program is substantial. A withdrawal, increase or redirection of this aid may be
possible and would be adaptable to the "economic sortie."
(2) Operations might be conducted against the Antiokan tin
industry in which Marshal Gondomar has a. direct and personal
interest.
(3) Antioka has been relying upon wheat obtained by purchase
and barter from the United States. Perhaps this supply could be cut
off if other sources could be blocked.
( 4) There is substantial trade in hard goods and textiles that may
be interrupted or increased.
In addition to the possibilities for economic warfare mentioned
in the facts there is an indefinite range of other possibilities. These
might include interference ,vith loans sought by Antioka; action
against Antiokan assets in the United States; or a naval surface,
subsurface and air blockade of Antioka or Nueva. With modifications
in technique and an adequate flow of information, any of these
· devices can be shaped to an "economic sortie."
There are two criteria which an acceptable economic weapon
must satisfy: (1) The weapon must be supportable by other techniques ranging from persuasive diplomatic devices to physical force
(Sustentiv~e Range). ( 2) Collateral repercussions through use of
the wealth weapon must be suppressible (A1nbit of Ar·rest). These
criteria, in many instances, overlap. Both are aspects of the major
desideratum of economy of force.

c. SUSTENTIVE RANGE-AMBIT OF ARREST
A wealth weapon, used as a primary policy device in economic warfare, is not an exclusive policy device. Once a basic "guideline" or "directory~' decision is obtained by pressure upon Gondomar,
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this decision becomes meaningful only when supported by "executorial" decisions for the period desired. 8 In effect, the decision
maker must be locked upon his course. Supporting the decision
maker in obtaining the required executorial decisions is a vital part
of this continuing direction.
The policy devices to secure this continuing direction can be
tentatively projected at the time the primary \vealth weapon is
selected. When conditions produced by the use of the wealth weapon
are analyzed, further action by the use of wealth or other weapons
can then be determined precisely.
But care must be taken that the \vealth weapon selected for
initial use does not preclude supporting action to obtain the
requisite executorial decisions or further guideline decisions. For
example, if wealth pressure upon Gondomar results in resistance
to him by his o\vn party or a major political group within the
country, he may be forced into a position in \vhich he cannot call
upon the United States for help \vithout seriously disturbing his
domestic political support.

111arshall 111ission to China:
Sustentive Range of Economic Policy
A difficulty of this kind arose during the Marshall Mission to
China in 1946. Although extensive American aid was necessary in
China to rebuild its economy, and for this reason could not be
delayed indefinitely ,9 both President Truman and General Marshall
held out economic assistance to the Generalissimo as an inducement
both to reforms \vithin the J(uomintang and to cooperation by the
Nationalists in a viable truce \vith the Chinese Communists.
General Marshall considered no stable Nationalist Government
possible \vithout substantial popular support. This support he
thought might be developed most rapidly by reforms within the
Kuomintang. The General's instructions authorized him to state
that a China disunited and torn by civil strife \vas not a proper
place for American economic assistance or military aid. 10
Extensive aid \vas given the Nationalist Government under~Lend
Lease and commitments \vere honored to transport Nationalist troops
by air following the Japanese surrender. UNRRA, to ·which the
s "Executorial" is used in the sense of any decision required to execute a
policy and therefore described an area broader than that of the "administrative" decision, including judicial decisions as well as decisions in informal
groups affected by the basic decision.
9 See 15 Department of State Bulletin, 34 ( 1946).
10 United States Relations with China, 132 (Department of State Publication
3573) (1949)
0

223
United States 'vas the major contributor, gave substantial aid to
the Chinese in 1945 and 1946. But General Marshall opposed credits
by the Export-Import B ank. He did not recommend these until,
by early 1946, the outlook for a peaceful settlement of the Nationalist-Communist conflict appeared promising. 11
The Export-Import Bank ultimately granted $82,800,000 in credits
to the Nationalists. Upon the further recommendation of General
Marshall, the B ank earmarked $500,000,000 of its funds for China,
although implementing agreements 'vere never made.
In the Lend-Lease Pipeline Agreement, the United States permitted delivery to the Nationalist Government on long-term credits
of civilian-type equipment and supplies contracted under the LendLease program but undelivered on V-J Day. Fifty-one million
seven hundred thousand dollars in equipment and supplies 'vere
covered. There 'vas also minor technical collaboration in agriculture
and forestry.
An aid program of even this limited scope could be played upon
both by Communists and Kuomintang extremists to obstruct the
efforts of General Marshall. Both sides could cultivate the xenophobic
and antiwestern bias of large segments of the Chinese to block
both reforms in the J(uomintang and reciprocal concessions by
Nationalists and Communists to implement the truce. As stated
by the Department of State: 12
The Chinese Communists professed to regard measures of
aid to China and official statements in Washington as proving
their contention that American economic and military support
to the Chinese Government would continue to be given irrespective of whether the National Government offered the
Communists a fair and reasonable basis for settlement of
military and political differences. The Communists maintained
that new legislation intended to aid China, 'vhich was then
under consideration by the United States Congress, was reinforcing the National Government's tendency to deal with the
Communists by force and was thus contributing to all-out civil
war. * * * (The legislation concerned a military advisory group
to act in accordance ·with the military reorganization agreement of 25 F~bruary 1946) * * *
At the same time some reactionary Kuomintang elements in
inner government circles 'vere utilizing American measures as
a basis for pressing the Generalissimo to push forward with a
plan of extermination against the Communists. Yet these and
u Ibid., 226.
t2 Ibid., 170-171.
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other Kuomintang extremists appeared to be joining in antiAmerican agitation on the grounds that American economic
pressure was causing American imports to displace Chinese
products, bankrupt Chinese industrialists and prevent Chinese
recovery.
These Kuomintang groups were also antagonistic to the
restraint exercised by General Marshall and his assistants on the
National Government with regard to an anti-Communist military campaign and were even using the Communsit line against
American intervention in pursuance of their aim to free the
National Government from any American impediment to drastic
anti-Communist action. The agitation and propaganda resulting from the activity of the different factions was being manifested in mass demonstrations, press campaigns and mob
actions. * * *
On July 7 the Chinese Communist Party issued a manifesto
containing a bitter attack on American policy toward China
and a protest against what the Communist termed American
military and financial aid to the National Government, which
encouraged the civil-war policy of the Kuomintang. General
Marshall had previously refrained from comment on such
propaganda attacks, but the coincidence of events led him to
inform General Chou En -lai of the serious blow to the negotiations such propaganda attacks represented, paralleling as they
did similar propaganda releases from Moscow, and of the
impossibility of his serving any useful purpose in mediation and
in the termination of hostilities while such attacks continued. * * *
As General Marshall, in this· hostile environment, attempted to ·
hold together his disintegrating truce arrangement, the Communists
meanwhile assuming a more aggressive posture by attacks upon
American military personnel, his position was seriously jeopardized
by the Sino-U.S. Surplus Property Agreement of 30 August 1946.
The Surplus Property Agreement was concluded in Shanghai
between Mr. T. V. Soong, President of the Executive Yuan and
Mr. Thomas B. McCabe, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
and Foreign Liquidation Commissioner. The United States agreed
to sell to the Nationalists for $205,000,000 small naval craft; communications, construction, electrical, medical and chemical equipment and supplies; shop and industrial machinery; vehicles of all
types; and air force items. The property had a procurement value
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of $900,000,000 and was said to cover only items with a civilian
end-use potential. 13
Against the consideration of $205,000,000 was set off $150,000,000
due by the United States to China for supplies furnished United
States forces during World War II. The remaining $55,000,000 was
to be paid in Chinese currency on a long-term basis. Twenty million
dollars was to be used by the United States in cultural and educational activities in China. The balance of $35,000,000 was to be used
for acquisition of real property and other United States expenses in
China. The United States also established a fund of $30,000,000
to be used for shipping the surplus and technical services arising
out of the transfer.
It is improbable that the Surplus Property Agreement was
intended as an "economic sortie"-unless this was the Nationalist
view of the matter. The surplus was located in India, China and
upon numerous Pacific Islands where both storage facilities and
adequate maintenance cre·ws were lacking. Unless the surplus could
be utilized promptly, it would be destroyed by the tropical climate
and exposure.
A feeble effort appears to have been made to turn this exigency
to diplomatic advantage. President Truman emphasized in an
exchange of letters with the Generalissimo between August lOth
and August 31st the necessity that Chinese internal problems be
settled peacefully before extensive American aid could commence. 14
Whether the exchange was initiated to coincide with the Agreement, or the Agreement signed to coincide with the exchange, cannot
be determined from published materials. Although the Chinese
were given 22 months within which to remove the surplus, there
would be a sufficient logistical lag to prevent use of the property in
any immediate assault against the Communists. At the same time
the transfer would indicate to the Generalissimo the quality and
quantity of the remaining "carrots" in the American bin. This was
"weak fare" for "warfare"; but the Agreement, "sortie" or not,
both blocked the truce negotiations and tended to neutralize the
political impact of all American aid extended thereafter to the
Nationalists until they were driven from the mainland in 1949.
As "economio warfare" the Agreement lacked sustentive range
because it provided apparently definitive proof of a Communist
13 The writer has not had access to a verbatim copy of the Agreement. A
fairly detailed summary of the provisions appears in 15 Department of State
Bulletin, 548 ( 1946).
14 United States Relations With China, 652-654 (Department of State Publication 3573) ( 1949).

226
charge, difficult to refute in the minds of Chinese-the minds that
counted, that the Generalissimo was entirely dependent upon American support and could never be more than a "puppet of American
imperialists.~' The Agreement also provided an apparent foundation for the charge that the United States actually had no interest
in a viable truce but was buying time to build up Nationalist
strength.
Typical of this propaganda, as it reached a fever pitch, was
the passage in a speech by Chou En -lai, broadcast from Yen an in
January 1947: 15
The people of the whole nation were welcoming President
Truman's statement on China and General Marshall's mediation
efforts in China a year ago, but not before long the true nature
of the China pol~cy of the American imperialists was exposed,
and the high treason diplomacy o.£ Chiang Kai-shek's regime
was also fully unmasked.
Since then, from tens of thousands of students to the broad
masses of residents in big cities all over China have been shouting these slogans: 'U.S. Army quit China,' 'oppose American
intervention in China ,s internal affairs,' 'oppose Quisling style
diplomacy,' 'oppose the Sino-American trade treaty'; and the
like * * *
And the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
stated in February 1947: 16
* * * Since January 10, 1946, however, Chinese Kuomintang
government has not only enacted many arbitrary domestic
measures but also has many times singly conducted diplomatic
negotiations of a serious nature with certain foreign governments. In the course of understandings, both oral and written,
secret and open, without these agreements and understandings
having been passed by the Political Consultative Conference or
consulting opinion of this party and other parties and groups
participating in Political Consultative Conference.
These diplomatic negotiations include loans from foreign
governments, continuation of Lend-Lease, buying and accepting
of munitions and surplus war materials, forming of treaties
regarding special rights in commerce, navigation, aviation and
other economic and legal special rights.
These negotiations and agreements request or permit foreign
land, sea and naval forces to be stationed in or operate on the
seas, waterways, territories, and in the air of the country, and
15

16

Ibid., 707.
Ibid., 719.
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to enter or occupy and jointly construct or make use of military
bases and points strategic to the national defense. They furthermore request or permit foreign military and other personnel to
participate in organization, training, transportation and military
operations of land, air and naval forces of the country, and to
become conversant with military and other state secrets of the
country. They also permit such serious matters as foreign intervention in internal affairs.
These measures of the Chinese l{uomintang government are
completely contrary to the will of the Chinese people and they
have plunged and will continue to plunge China into civil
war, reaction, national disgrace, loss of national rights, colonization and crisis of chaos and collapse. In order to rescue the
mother land from this calamity, to protect national rights and
interests and the dignity of the Political Consultative Conference, the Chinese Communist Party solemnly states: This
party will not either now nor in the future recognize any foreign
loans, any treaties which disgrace the country and strip away
its rights, and any of the above mentioned agreements and
understandings established by the Kuomintang government
after January 10, 1946, nor will it recognize any future diplomatic negotiation of the same character which have not been
passed by Political Consultative Conference or which have not
obtained agreement o£ this party and other parties and groups
participating in the Political Consultative Conference. * * *
A similar mixture of half truth and falsity was prepared and
spread to embarrass General Marshall during the negotiations for
the August 30th Agreement and thereafter. His position was made
doubly difficult because on 29 July 1946 munitions exports had been
embargoed from the United States to China and also in mid-August
from the Pacific bases. This action ''V"as taken, apparently, to
buttress General Marshall's neutral position as mediator, rather
than as a form of pressure upon the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang leaders.l 7 The Surplus Property Agreement then gave the
Communists a new propaganda foothold.

General Marshall appears to have taken rapid action in an effort
to offset this propaganda opening given to the Reds. In the words
of the State Department : 18
In view of continued Chinese Communist propaganda attacks
on the surplus property agreement of August 30, 1946, General
~larshall gave a very detailed explanation of this transaction
17

Ibid., 355.

1s Ibid., 180_.
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to the Communist Party representative. l-Ie pointed out that this
transaction had been under discussion since the beginning of
1946 and had been almost settled at the time of General Marshall's departure for the United States in March. During his
visit to the United States he had ironed out most of the difficulties involved and the failure to reach an agreement on this
transaction in February had resulted from Chinese Government
efforts to improve the terms. The alternative to completing an
agreement with China for the sale of this surplus property was
the immediate disposal of the property to other governments
in the Far East or dumping it in the ocean, courses of action
which would have deprived China of material of considerable
importance in the economic rehabilitation of the country.
General Marshall continued that Chinese Communist propaganda had imputed to this transaction every evil purpose
possible and that great harm had thus been done. He concluded
that while he accepted this propaganda as inevitable, he was
greatly disturbed when a proposal such as that for the informal
Five-Man Committee was being destroyed as a result of such
propaganda.
The Chinese Communist Party representatives, however, continued to be critical of the surplus property agreement on the
grounds that items such as trucks, communications equipment
and army rations and uniforms would be used for civil war
purposes and other items would be sold on the market and
the proceeds thereof expended for military purposes. * * *
The Agreement thus provided the Communists with a ready
answer to resist influence by persuasive diplomati~ techniques.
Their punch in fact had been "telegraphed" by Stalin in his discussions with Secretary Byrnes in Mosco·w in December 1945. Stalin .
suggested that Chiang Kai-shek "would lose his influence if the
Chinese people got the impression that he was depending on foreign
troops." 19
The United States, after demobilization, lacked adequate military
forces to affect the issue in China decisively. Its remaining weapons
were advice and economic aid. The advice ·was difficult to give and
poorly received because of chauvinistic sentiment within the Kuomintang. The economic aid, massive as it later became, was considered
by no one likely to affect the Nationalist-Communist contest. The
battle at this time was one for the loyalties of the Chinese. This
loyalty was either unaffected or repelled by the American assistance.
There were no rational alternatives open to the United States
19

Feis, The China Tangle, 427 (1953).
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other than extending aid. But the effect of this aid h ad been effectively precluded by the antiforeign gambit placed in the hands of
the Communists by the Surplus Property Agreement.
In testifying before an executive session of the Senate For eign
Relations Committee, General Marshall, then Secretary of State,
discussing the proposed China Aid Act of 1948, put the matter
succinctly: 20
We must be prepared to face the possibility that the present
Chinese Government may not be successful in maintaining itself
against the Communist forces or other opposition that may
arise in China. Yet, from the foregoing, it can only be concluded that the present Government evidently cannot reduce the
Chinese Communists to a completely negligible factor in China.
To achieve that objective in the immediate future it would
be necessary for the United States to underwrite the Chinese
Government's military effort, on a wide and probably constantly increasing scale, as well as the Chinese economy. The
U.S. would have to be prepared virtually to take over the
Chinese Government and administer its economic, military
and governmental affairs.
Strong Chinese sensibilities regarding infringment of China.'s
sovereignty, the intense feeling of nationalism among all
Chinese and the unavailability of qualified American personnel
in the large numbers required argue strongly against attempting
any such sol uti on.
It would be impossible to estimate the final cost of a course
of action of this magnitude. It certainly would be a continuing
operation for a long time to come. It would involve this Government in a continuing commitment from which it would be practically impossible to withdraw, and it would very probably
involve grave consequences to this nation by making of China
an arena of international conflict. An attempt to underwrite
the Chinese economy and the Chinese Government's military
effort represents a burden on the U.S. economy and a military
responsibility 'vhich I cannot recommend as a course of action
for this Government.
On the other hand 've in the Executive Branch of the Government have an intense desire to help China. As a matter of fact,
I have struggled and puzzled over the situation continuously
since my return. Our trouble has been to find a course which we
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could reasonably justify before Congress on other than emotional grounds. * * *
Present developments make it unlikely, as previously Indicated, that any amount of U.S. military or economic aid
could make the present Chinese Government capable of reestablishing and then maintaining its control throughout all
of China. * * *

Peruvia;n Coup d'etat:
Ambit of Arrest

~

As important as the criterion that a wealth weapon have sustentive
range, which the Surplus Property Agreement lacked, is the closely
related criterion that side effects of the weapon be suppressible.
This, as noted previously, is described as the "ambit of arresf' of
effects of the weapon. These side effects are notoriously difficult to
foresee in economic warfare.
All interaction stimulated by economic warfare is not susceptible
to control. It is critical, ho,vever, that conditions precluding accomplishment of the goal of use of the wealth weapon be subject
to influence.
An example of the difficulty in dealing with the ambit of arrest
of an economic 'veapon is illustrated by the United States response
to the Peruvian coup d'etat of 18 July 1962. Within a few hours
after President Prado's overthrow was announced, the United
States broke diplomatic relations with Peru and terminated all aid
except a school lunch program. Within a month, on 17 August 1962,
diplomatic relations were resumed and aid, other than the military
programs, was restored. By this date the military regime was firmly
in control, having survived a general strike and broken the voting
power of the opposition APRA party.
No doubt motivated by a desire to regain the goodwill of the
United States, the Junta gave President Prado his freedom when
his term of office expired. Impartial presidential elections were
promised in 1963 under a revised electoral law.
These were liberal gestures, but the Junta had declared these
policies in substance shortly after it seized power. Economic pressure may have produced an unequivocal statement of these policies.
But there seems little reason to suppose that the Junta ever intended
to do other than carry out its original commitments.
The purposes sought by the United States in terminating aid to
Peru were never stated with clarity in official press releases. News
commentators were in some confusion concerning the matter.
Probably two objectives were sought: (1) Weakening the Junta
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to permit its overthro'v by the APRA general strike and (2)
Demonstrating United States disapproval of military coups d'etat
directed against civilian governments elected by democratic processes.
No doubt the latter objective was partially achieved. However,
a wholly convincing expression of disapproval would require withholding aid while the Junta held po,ver, since a few months earlier
aid had been restored to a civilian government supported by military
officers who had overthrown President Frondizi of Argentina. The
net psychological effect upon prospective military rebels seems to
have been that of a precautionary rap upon the knuckles. But the
first objective, if in fact overthrow of the Junta was an objective, was
unattainable because the United States had no effective method to
control side effects of the 'vithdra wal of aid. There was no ambit
of arrest of these effects.
These side effects stemmed principally from resistance within
Peru to intrusion by the United States into its internal affairs. There
was support to this resistance . by leading Latin American states,
including Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
To carry through its Peruvian policy to the goal of overthrow
of the Junta by nonviolent means would require moves by the
United States against a substantial number of other Latin American
countries. These moves might be by economic or other sanctions.
In all likelihood such moves would have been inconsistent with the
principles of the Alliance for Progress and probably also in conflict with the nonintervention provisions of treaties to which the
United States is a party. Pragmatically, and legally as well, the
United States was barred from containing the forces which its
withdrawal of aid set in motion.
The prospect of military interference in the Peruvian elections
of June 1962 had been evident for months before results of the
elections were known. Military members of President Prado's cabinet
had warned that the elections would be vitiated by fraud.
The facts upon which this apprehension of fraud rested, or the
findings of fraud alleged by the military after the elections, were
never publicized in the United States. It is reasonable to surmise,
however, that the underlying difficulty was total incompatibility
between the Peruvian military elite and the leaders of the APRA
party.
APRA had been founded by Dr. Haya de la Torre, its presidential
candidate in the elections of 1962. The party controlled the Peruvian
Confederation of Labor.
In its early years, APRA had been dominated by Communists.
It had engaged in two armed clashes with the Peruvian Army and
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Navy, once at Trujillo in 1932, where a number of Army officers had
been killed, and thereafter at Callao in 1948, where it fomented
a naval mutiny. Although APRA at the time of the coup d'etat in
1962 was reputed to be mildly socialistic and strongly anticommunist,
the old leaders, such as Haya de la Torre, remained. The latter, in
particular, was anathema to the generals and admirals of the
Peruvian Armed Services.
There was little that the United States could do about this great
gulf between APRA and the military services. However, United
States policy makers appear to have been convinced that APRA
was supported by a popular majority and would provide the best
guarantee against a communist foothold in Peru. From press releases, it appears that Ambassador Loeb had informed certain
Peruvian military leaders that a coup d'etat would be opposed by
United States sanctions.
"\Vhen the votes were tallied some three weeks after the election,
Dr. Haya de la Torre was found to have prevailed by about 14,000
votes over his nearest opponent, Belaunde, who had been supported
by a number of influential military leaders. A third party, led by
former President Odria, polled sufficient votes to swing the balance
for or against APRA in the presidential election.
Under the Peruvian Constitution no presidential candidate was
elected unless he polled more than one third of the votes cast. If no
candidate polled the necessary one third, the election was thrown
into the Peruvian Congress. There APRA could prevail unless
Belaunde and Odria combined.
The center of power thus shifted to Odria, a retired general, who
had outlawed APRA and bottled up Haya de la Torre for five
years in the Colombian embassy in Lima during his earlier term in
office as President. Surprisingly, although Odria's Social Christian
Party had substantial support from certain labor unions, discussions commenced between Odria and APRA leaders with a view to
withdrawal of Haya de la Torre and a substitution of Odria for
the Presidency.
Influential military leaders opposed this alliance. For this and
other reasons the discussions broke down.
The Odria-APRA discussions were the last clear chance to a void
a coup d'etat. On 11 July the National Electoral Board rejected
a petition by Belaunde to set aside the vote in critical La Libertad
Department. The Board refused credence to military reports of
irregularities in this Department in registration and voting.
When President Prado refused to set the elections aside, since he
had no constitutional power to do this, the military Junta seized
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control. The response of the United States followed within hours.
The withdrawal of aid came as a shock to the Junta, most of
whom were well disposed towards the United States. There is no
indication that a withdrawal of aid deflected them from their course
In any way.
The Junta took steps to mend its breached relations with the
United States. But because the Junta controlled communications
within Peru, the military communications net extending into the
most primitive communities, the withdrawal of aid could be turned
to the advantage of the Junta.
Odria, who had advocated a constitutional approach to solve the
election difficulty, no\v denounced the American intervention. He
gave his tacit blessing to provisional government by the Junta, and
played no small part by withdrawal of union support from APRA
in breaking the general strike called against the Junta on 21 July.
By the end of July the nationalistic reaction had been such that
APRA's voting power was temporarily broken. Business was returning to normal. Argentina and Brazil made gestures of support for
the Junta; although other Latin American states, such as Venezuela
and Chile, had broken diplomatic relations.
In the early days of August, the facts gradually became clear
that the Junta did control Peru. The Junta was accepted by most
Peruvians, was willing to honor i·ts international obligations and
planned to return the country to a civilian government after reforms
in the election laws. Further economic pressure would be likely to
push the military leaders into a form of Andean "Nasserism."
Peru would be encouraged to seek trade outlets other than its
traditional markets in the United States.
For these reasons, and perhaps others undisclosed, there was no
effort to bring pressure by removal of the premium on Peruvian
sugar sold in the United States market. This technique had been
used earlier with good effect against General Trujillo of the
Dominican Republic.
The motive underlying action by the United States was laudable.
The election had been a fair one by Peruvian standards. The polling
places were supervised by the military. The allegations of fraud
were considered by a presumably unbiased constitutional Electoral
Board and rejected.
But apart from the propriety of the object, or the prospect for its
attainment by other means, the wealth technique used precluded
attainment of the goal. Forces not subject to control by the United
States generated by wealth -pressure strengthened rather than
weakened the regime assaulted.
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2. Choice of a Wealth Weapon to be Used Against Antioka
a. MANIPULATION OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY

ASSISTANCE
Economic and Military Aid Programs
The economic and military aid to Antioka may be manipulated
as a wealth weapon. Ten million dollars currently is being expended
in An tioka as military assistance. A loan of $12,000,000 has been
made from the Development Loan Fund. How much of these
amounts remain unexpended is unknown at the time of the Conference. A Development Grant is under consideration.
The domestic law of the United States permits the President to
suspend or terminate economic and military foreign aid in his
discretion.21 Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended,22
the President controls the terms and conditions of Development
Loans,~ Development Grants 24 and Military Assistance. 25
With respect to Development Loans and Grants, including assistance rendered under the Alliance for Progress,26 the President's
authority clearly includes the power to determine the consistency
of the aid activity with other development activities planned. He
may also determine the extent to which the recipient government
is responsive to the vital economic, political and social concerns of
its people. 27
The Congress has stipulated Military Assistance will be furnished
solely for the internal security of the country concerned; for its
legitimate self-defense; to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective measures consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations or collective measures requested by
the United Nations to maintain or restore international peace and
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 75 Stat. 424, 444 (1961) section 617: "Assistance under any provision of this Act may, unless sooner terminated by the
President, be terminated by concurrent resolution. * * *"
22 At the time of writing, amendments appear in the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1962, 76 Stat. 255 (1962) and the .Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, 1962, 75 Stat. 717 (1961).
2:1

75 Stat. 426 (1961) section
24 75 Stat. 427 (1961) section
2s 75 Stat. 435 (1961) section
26 The Alliance for Progress

201 (b).
211 (a).
503.
appears as an amendment to the Act for International Development of 1961 (Part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) in
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 255, 257 (1962). The powers of the
President with respect to assistance under the Alliance for Progress are as
extensive as under the other aid laws.
27 E.g., 75 Stat. 426 (1961) section 201(b) (4) (5).
2a
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security. 28 Defense articles cannot be furnished on a grant basis to
any country at a cost in excess of $3,000,000 per fiscal year unless
the President determines, among other things, that the country
conforms to the principles and purposes of the United Nations and
the defense articles will be utilized by the country to maintain its
own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free
world. 29
In each executive agreement made with a foreign state for
Military Assistance, the Congress has required stipulations concerning the use and disposition of defense articles. For example, the
Agreement between the United States and El Salvador contains
the following clauses: 30
1. * * * The defense articles and defense services referred to
above shall be used for internal security purposes and for the
De·fense of the Western Hemisphere in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance.
2. * * * El Salvador will not permit any use of defense articles
and defense services furnished under this Agreement by anyone
not an officer, employee or agent of the Government of the
Republic of El Salvador.
3. * * * El ,Salvador will not transfer, or permit any officer,
employee or agent of that country to transfer such defense
articles and defense services by gift or otherwise.
4. * * * El Salvador will not, without the consent of the
United States, use or permit the use of such defense articles
and defense services for purposes other than those for which
furnished.
5. * * * El Salvador ·will maintain the security of such defense
articles and defense services, and 'viii provide substantially
the same degree of security protection afforded to such articles
by the United States Government.
6. * * * El Salvador will, as the United States may require,
permit continuous observation and review by, and furnish
necessa.r y information to, representatives of the United States
with regard to the use of such defense articles and defense
services. * ~ *
The General Agreement for Economic, Technical and Related
28 75 Stat. 436 (1961) section 505(a). Military Assistance provisions are contained in the International Peace and Security Act of 1961 (Part II of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961).
29

75 Stat. 436 (1961) section 406(b).

ao TIAS 5040 (1962).
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Assistance between El Salvador and the United States, also a fair
example of the agreements negotiated by the United States for
nonmilitary economic assistance, states in Article VI (2) :
All or any part of the program of assistance provided hereunder may, except as may otherwise be provided in arrangements agreed upon pursuant to Article I hereof, be terminated
by either Government if that Government determines that because of changed conditions the continuation of such assistance
is unnecessary or undesirable. The termination of such assistance
under this provision may include the termination of deliveries of
any commodities hereunder not yet delivered. * * * 31
A clause similar to this has been inserted in current agreements
made pursuant to the Alliance for Progress.32
In addition to his power to withdraw economic or military aid
conferred by domestic law and reserved in the aid agreements, the
military aid agreements being expressly subject to the provisions of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President has inherent
power in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States,
pursuant to Article II, section 2 (2) of the United States Constitution, to terminate any aid program "\vhen proper management
of the foreign affairs of the United States requires it.
The discretion in the President to increase economic or military
aid to Antioka is not so plenary as his power of suspension or
termination. He is certainly limited by the amounts appropriated by
the Congress £or foreign aid. Specific limits for certain classes of
aid may also be imposed. For example, a. limit of $57,500,000 per
fiscal year has been imposed by the Congress upon the total value
of defense articles transferred by grant to all American Republics.33
Apart from an absolute prohibition of assistance to the "present" ,
government of Cuba * * */the Castro-Communist governmen~/* * *,
a matter not relevant to the considerations of the Conference, in
Situation 5, there are only three absolute barriers to an increase in
aid in the discretion of the President.
Aid cannot be given to a country unless the President determines
the country is not dominated or controlled by the international
Communist movement.34
If a country is taken over by Communists, aid cannot be increased

31
22

TIAS 4971 (1961).
E.g., Agreement Between United States and Dominican Republic, TIAS

4936 (1962) Art. VII (2).
aa 75 Stat. 438 ( 1961) section 511 (a).
34 75 Stat. 445 (1961) section 620 (b).
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but must be terminated, no matter what the potential of a wealth
weapon involving an increase in aid may be.
Aid is sharply restricted if a country receiving assistance under
the FMeign Assistance Act of 1961 nationalizes, expropriates or
seizes property owned by a United States citizen or by a corporation, association or partnership in which a United States citizen
has at least 50% beneficial o'vnership; or expropriates indirectly by
methods such as discriminatory taxation; and then fails to take
steps within six months to offer relief to the United States citizen
suffering loss. The President must suspend the aid program to the
country concerned until he is satisfied appropriate steps by the
country to give relief to the citizen are being taken. 35 I£ he must
suspend aid, he cannot increase or restore the aid until the requisite
facts can be found.
Also no monetary assistance can be given to a government 'vhich
will use the money to compensate owners of expropriated or
nationalized property. I£ the President finds money diverted for
this purpose, no further a,i d can be given under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 until the amount diverted is refunded to the
United States.36
Other barriers in domestic law to an increase jn aid are partial
only and may be avoided if the President finds the increase in the
national interest or necessary for the national security. Thus if the
President determines that a Communist country is not controlled
by the "international Communist conspiracy" and reports this to the
Congress; and also finds and reports : ( 1) the assistance is vital
to the security of the United States; and (2) the assistance will
promote the independence of the recipient country from international communism; aid may be extended under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.31
A country. which furnishes assistance to the "present"* * */CastroCommunist/* * * government of Cuba may receive aid, and thus
an increase in aid if necessary, i:f the President "determines that
such assistance is in the national interest of the United States.~' 38
If a country is indebted to any United States citizen or person for
goods or services furnished, the indebtedness arising under an unconditional guaranty of payment given by the government or its
3576 Stat. 260 (1962) section 301(3) (new subsection "(e)" to section 620 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961).
86 Ibid., (new subsection "(g)" to section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of1961).
37 Ibid., (new subsection "(f)" to section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of1961).
38

75 Stat. 719 (1961) section 109; 76 Stat. 260 (1962) section 301(d) (1).
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predecessor, the indebtedness not being denied, and the creditor
having exhausted his legal remedies, including arbitration, the
President can nevertheless extend aid if he finds that a denial of
aid would be "contrary to the national security." 39

Possible Uses of Eaonomic and Military
Aid Programs in Economic Warfare
It is a fair assumption that aid agreements with Antioka have
clauses similar to those in the economic and military aid agreements
with El Salvador. There would thus seem no obstacle in either
domestic or international law to a suspension, reduction or termination of any feature of the current aid program.
The economic aid agreement is terminable. The military aid agreement is subject to the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
"'Furthermore, our intelligence services may discover Gondomar has
delivered to Salvaje defense articles received from the United
States in violation of the Agreement.
Also, if an increase in aid to Antioka should appear a desirable
method for interrupting aid to Salvaje by Antioka, there is nothing
except a limit on appropriations by Congress to prevent this increase. Antioka is not controlled by the international Communist
movement. It has not nationalized or expropriated property o£
United States citizens nor has it refused to pay guaranteed debts
to them based upon goods and services rendered.
Rewards to Antioka for violations of international law by intervening in N uevan internal affairs may place a premium on legal
"waywardness" by Gondomar and the members of his government.
For this reason, an increase in aid is not a desirable course under
the circumstances but cannot be excluded completely as an alternative.
Manipulating economic or military aid or both appears superficially as the most desirable method for pressure to interrupt the
trade with Salvaje. The "legal" latitude for action, both in domestic
and international law is broad. The aid program is amenable to
rapid change. Quite certainly any change in the Program W@uld have
substantial impact upon Antiokan internal affairs. Some of the
requisites for an effective "economic sortie" are met. But certain
major requisites are missing.

Inability to Direc:t lJJ anipulations of
Foreign Aid: Delayed Reaction
The first requisite missing is susceptibility to direction. If our
39

76 Stat. 260 (1962) section 30l(d) (2).
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estimates of Gondomar's power to inter rupt the aid to S alvaje are
correct, our economic action should be "aimed" at Gondomar .
An "economic sortie" cannot be directed as one would aim a r ifle
or lay artillery. The direction of an economic sortie, to the extent
that any analogy can be made to a weapon, resembles the direction
by target stimulus, employed in the heat, light or noise seeking
projectile or missile. The point of impact of the heat, light or noise
seeking weapon depends upon configuration of the target area and
activity within it.
In economic warfare, the impact point of the force developed by
an economic weapon depends upon the value configuration of the
target area or value structure of the group within which influence is
sought. A wealth 'veapon must be chosen which will follow the value
"channels" or create the -kind of interaction that will result in
psychical impact upon the target. This capability, like the missile
directed by target stimulus, depends upon the weapon chosen.
Ohoice of the weapon is the key to direction.
Within six months or a year, manipulation of the aid program
might induce Gondomar to cut off assistance to Salvaje. No immediate response by Gondomar should be anticipated because the
impact upon him would be secondary. The primary impact would be
upon military personnel, businessmen, agricultural workers or miners
within Antioka. These persons might then bring their influence to
bear upon Gondomar to act as the United States demands in order
to obtain restoration of the withheld aid. How quickly these indigenous influences could be brought to bear upon Gondomar depends
upon the influence channels in Antioka through which pressure
may be exerted; obstructions in these channels which Gondomar
might place; and supporting measures, by economic measures or
otherwise, which the United States might develop.
If Gondomar's political position is a strong one, his reaction to
a withdrawal of aid is likely to be slow even though the pressure
upon his people is great. Time is of the essence if Salvaje's military
effort is to be weakened or Scythian support of Salvaje brought
into the open before the meeting of the Organ of Consultation of
the Organization of American States. More time might be expended
in manipulating foreign aid than can be spared under the circumstances.
Even if a United States policy maker is prepared to wait until
the secondary effect occurs, the intensity of impact is speculative
because of difficulty in directing the thrust of the weapon. The
impact might be slight if persons within Antioka are injured who
have little influence upon Gondomar. A value loss to Antioka might
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be produced without a compensating decision advantageous to
hemisphere defense and security o£ the general community. It is
also possible that once influence is brought to bear upon Gondomar,
his political position will be so shaken by its intensity that any
decision he makes in response to the United States demand will be
rendered illusory.

Limited Ambit of Arres't and Sustentive
Range in Foreign Aid Manipulations
Manipulation o£ the aid program also suffers as an effective economic weapon from a limited ambit o£ arrest o£ side effects and
a lack o£ sustentive range. These features, as previously indicated,
are closely related.
Several questions should be considered concerning the ambit o£
arrest o£ side effects. Gondomar is now friendly toward the United
States. Other problems between Antioka and the United States,
perhaps more serious than the one now presented, will arise in the
future.
To facilitate the solution o£ these problems, assuming Gondomar
continues in power, a policy should be avoided which reduces the
intensity o£ his expectations o£ indulgences to be derived from
continued friendship with the United States. I£ Gondomar looks
elsewhere for aid, what avenues for influence by Scythia in Antioka
may be presented and what devices might the United States employ
to close these avenues?
Will opportunities be presented to Communists or other indigenous
radicals to aggrandize their power i£ economic and social distress
within An1:ioka. is increased by a suspension or termination o£ aid?
I£ radical shifts o£ power occur within An tioka by a suspension or
termination o£ aid, the United States may find itself in such a situation that the only technique available to moderate the rate o£
internal change is additional aid. Additional aid may accentuate
existing political cleavages in Antioka. A powerful but increasingly
isolated and economically dependent elite may be created upon
which the policies o£ the United States must then be oriented.
The restricted sustentive range o£ manipulations o£ foreign aid
in economic warfare is especially marked. This is due to the state
o£ the domestic law concerning foreign aid; "reciprocal controls"
which a recipient state can exert; and a "£olk-,vay" expectation o£
economic aid flowing from centers o£ great productivity, such as the
United States, the Soviet Union and the countries o£ Western
Europe. This folk-way expectation has emerged as a postulate o£ an
obligation to supply the "needs o£ the needy" upon which foreign
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aid reasoning In both donor and recipient states tends to be
founded.
Limitat~ons

Imposed By Domestic Law

Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and its amendments
there is danger in exerting intense pressure, by economic means or
otherwise, upon a state, particularly a small one. A later extension
or resumption of aid to the state may then be foreclosed unless
the Congress expressly grants to the President the authority to
extend or resume economic aid.
Withdrawals of foreign aid tend to exert much pressure upon
a recipient state. The response of a small state threatened with
economic pressure by a larger and more powerful antagonist tends
to be a defense by wealth weapons. Those most conveniently at
hand are devices, such as confiscation or discriminatory taxation, to
deprive nationals of the larger and more powerful antagonist of
their local assets. This was one response of the Castro Government in the early phases of the "Sugar Encounter" described In
Chapter II.
By Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended in 1962, if the small state is forced to the extreme of
expropriation as a defensive measure, the flexibility of the President
in using foreign aid for further pressure is limited. The President
cannot renew the aid until the expropriating state takes appropriate
steps to discharge its obligations under international law to the
injured United States citizen. He will have to go to Congress for the
appropriate authority.
A similar problem arises concerning the statutory prohibition of
aid to the government of a country dominated or controlled by the
international Communist movement. 40 If pressure forces a state into
the Communist orbit because the ambit of arrest of the side effects
of a wealth weapon is restricted, efforts to retrieve the state as a freeworld member by cajoling its government with foreign aid are
precluded.
The President in such a case must use funds other than those
appropriated in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.
Alternatively he might go to the Congress for increased authority;
rely upon a wealth weapon ot)ler than foreign aid; utilize some
other coercive or persuasive device; or simply write off the state
as a member of the free world and the property of United States
citizens in that state with it.
40

75 Stat. 445 (1961) section 620(b).
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A technique offering a degree o£ sustentive range in the manipulation o£ foreign aid is to "lead" with an "indulgence" or aid increase.
The aid increase can then be coupled by a withdrawal o£ the aid
to secure the desired decision. A lack o£ sustenti ve range appears
with the withdrawal. A "lead" with an increase in foreign aid to
Antioka would appear unwise i£ Gondomar in £act is the decision
maker to be influenced.

Reciprocal 0 ontrol in Foreign Aid
The element o£ "reciprocal control," 'vhich reduces the sustentive
range o£ withdra 'vals o£ foreign aid, has been considered by Professor George Liska. 41 Professor Liska views foreign aid as a
contest between the Soviet Union and the United States £or the
allegiance o£ uncommitted countries by influencing the processes
controlling the future institutions o£ the target states. 42 This perspective is widely shared.
An ideal foreign aid relationship, as Professor Liska sees it, is
one in 'vhich "the needs and demands o£ donor and recipient
* * */are/* * * neutralized 'vhenever the caliber o£ their interests
are comparable. * * * 43 This balance, he thinks, is not maintained
because the controls exercised by the recipient states often tend
to be more effective than the controls maintained by the United
States.
The reciprocal controls by the recipient, as described by Liska,
are usually conscious maximizations o£ the side effects o£ a wealth
weapon used against the recipient. In Antioka Gondomar might
point to the undesirable alternatives i£ his power is weakened by
a withdrawal o£ foreign aid. Castro-Communist elements almost
certainly are active in his country. Weakening Gondomar may
enhance the relative strength o£ the Castro-Communists.
He may, as did the Peruvian leaders in 1962, suggest reorientation
o£ Antiokan trade. His country now relies upon the United States
£or wheat, textiles and hard goods. These can be obtained elsewhere.
A flow o£ dollars to Antioka means a flow o£ dollars to United States
agriculture and industry so long as this trade pattern is maintained.
Perhaps Gondomar might threaten recourse to Scythia as a
substitute £or discontinued aid £rom the United States. While consumer goods furnished by Scythia may be below the standard
maintained by the United States, its military hardware may be as

Liska, The New Statecraft, 19-23 (1960).
Ibid., 4-5.
43 Ibid., 32.
41

42

243

satisfactory and its military advisors as good as those the United
States can provide.
Counterpressures of this sort have critical political force in the
United States. Foreign aid cannot be interrupted without publicity ;
and counterpublicity of threatened countermeasures may prevent
supporting action of any sort because of activity by stimulated
pressure groups within the United States.

Folk-Way Expectation of Aid: "Neofeudalism"
The folk-way expectation of aid flowing from centers of great
productivity, discussed in Chapter I of this book, cannot be said
to have reached a threshold of expression as a protolegal international institution. That it may cross this threshold within the
present century is a distinct possibility.
There are not many instances, whether in the family, private
charitable relationships, public charitable relationships, or extended
foreign aid programs, in which constant repetition of an indulgence
is not eventually regarded as a matter of right by the donee and an
obligation of the donor. With respect to foreign aid, the process is
much the same as that observed in domestic systems of law when a
legal prescription becomes supported by nonlegal conduct patterns.
Ethical norm~ are as easily created by law as law is developed in
response to changing ethical norms.
An extensive prolongation of aid to a state produces institutions
and conduct patterns based upon the flow of assistance. Especially
when aid has been extended to encourage the creation of nonviable
states, by the prevailing judgment in the Free World it appears
"ethically" wrong to interrupt this aid suddenly. This judgment
may well have molded attitudes concerning the interruption of aid
to a viable state as well.
While the donor of aid is legally free to withdraw it for coercion
or convenience, it is not ethically free to do so. The consequences of
the ethical breach must be considered. These consequences may range
from attriting .domestic support for an economic warfare program
to a total lack of foreign support from other states.
Withdrawing United States aid to Peru in 1962 initially had
domestic approval. This approval diffused as press reports emphasized the suddenness and force of the withdrawal and the
surprise of the military leaders at termination of the aid. The
Western Hemisphere states supporting the United States were
those which apprehended military coups d'etat and hoped to avert
these by insuring the success of the United States action. Other
states of the Free World were neutral or watched for an opportunity
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to divert Peruvian trade from the ·united States. The Communist
dominated political parties of Peru hoped to benefit by economic and
social distress which termination of the aid might produce; and
no doubt would have done so with the assistance of Castro-Communist Cuba or the Soviet Union had pressure by the United States
been maintained.
Whether further action by the United States against the Junta
would have received general political support in the United States
in August 1962 is debatable. That few allies of the United States
could be induced to join in punitive action against the Junta is
evident.
3. Exploitation of Trade in Tin, Wheat, Textiles and Hard Goods
Perhaps the most fruitful approach to force a decision by Gondomar to interrupt trade with Salvaje is to exploit the trade pattern
of Antioka with the United States or with other countries. The
most effective point of attack appears to be upon the tin industry
of Antioka because an advantage or detriment offered here will
affect Gondomar directly due to his personal interest in the production and sale of Antiokan tin.
While tin appears to be the only major export from Antioka
to the United States, there is no significant trade advantage to be
offered with respect to this commodity other than a premium or
subsidy above the world price. This premium or subsidy would
require action by Congress. The time available precludes the delay
Congressional action would require.
There is a tendency to overproduce tin in the world market. This
is due principally to the mechanization of tin mining. There is
not, however, the same tendency to fluctuations in production en- ·
countered in agricultural commodities.
There is a marked fluctuation in the consumption of tin. Tin
consumption is highly sensitive to changes in the level of business
activity. The consumption of tin is closely linked to steel consumption. Both metals are used in all important tin applications.
Tin is also price "inelastic." Fluctuating prices in tin have little
effect on the consumption ra.te, although the consumption rate
affects the price of tin.
Due to the demand for price stability in the world tin market,
there has developed, as in the case of sugar, an international commodity agreement, the latest being the International Tin Agreement
of 1960. 44 An International Tin Council established under this
agreement, with its seat in London, revises floor and ceiling prices
44 United Nations Tin Conference, 1960, Summary of Proceedings, CjCONF.
32}5, p. 25.
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established initially in the agreement, determines exportable quantities of tin from producing countries, and maintains a buffer
stock for the contribution and withdrawal of tin to maintain a
stable market price. The Manager of the buffer stock buys, sells
and maintains stocks of tin in accordance with detailed criteria stated
in the agreement.
United States refined tin imports are fairly constant. The imports
fluctuate because of interruptions in steel production, such as those
caused by strikes. Secondary tin, recovered from scrap, accounts
for about one third of the tin consumption in the United States.
This use of secondary tin, coupled with a trend to the use of paper
and plastic packaging suitable for deep freeze storage, will probably
maintain a constant level.
The demand for refined tin may increase. In a military emergency,
large quantities of tin are consumed. The United States has only
one tin smelter, at Texas City, Texas, once owned and operated
by the United States Government but no"\v in the hands of private
owners. This smelter accounts for imports of cassiterite or tin ore
into the United States.
While tin can be stored easily, United States rganufacturers do
not stockpile large quantities of tin because of its relatively high
cost. Tin ingot and cassiterite are already on the "free" customs
list. No tariff reduction is possible under the Trade Expansion Act of
1962.45 Such a tariff reduction would require in any event an expenditure of more time than could be allowed to obtain the desired
decision from Gondomar. Trade negotiations, the advice of the
Tariff Commission and Executive Departments and a public hearing would be required before a reduction upon appropriate items
could be put into effect.
Perhaps technical assistance or economic aid could be furnished
to enable Gondomar to lower the cost of production of tin and thus
operate on the world market with an advantageous profit margin.
Mechanizing the mines would reduce the labor force and increase
the problem of unemployment. Such a policy would have to be
reconciled with the policy supporting the Development Loan of

$12,000,000 to assist in resettlement of the tin workers. This loan
might have to be increased.
Purchases of tin for dollars or barter by the Commodity Credit
Corporation of "\vhea.t or some other agricultural product for tin
at an increased rate for the national stockpiles currently seem out
of the question. The stockpiles now contain a substantial surplus

45

76 Stat. 872 (1962).
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o£ tin ingot and have been under close Congressional scrutiny. An
increase of these holdings is excluded.
On the other hand, the stockpiled tin might be used to place
pressure on Gondomar by dumping part of the surplus to restrict
his market either in the United States or in other countries. This
might be done to the extent that it does not conflict with treaties,
executive agreements, or other international obligations of the
United States and does not damage the economy of the United
States or a country to which the United States is friendly.

Stockpiling Policy
The United States maintains four 46 stockpiles or "inventories"
of reserved strategic and critical materials deposited in various
warehouses and depots throughout the country. As of 31 December
1961, the acquisition cost of these materials was $8,708,672,700 and
the estimated market value was $7,720,001,400.
The materials are in the custody of the General Services Administration. Basic policies concerning acquisition and disposition
of the materials are made pursuant to acts of Congress by other
offices and agencies.
Two of the stockpiles are subject to the policy control of the
Office of Emergency Planning of the Executive Office of the
President. These are the "National" or "Strategic" stockpile, the
larger of the two, and the Defense Production Act (DPA) stockpile.
The National Stockpile is assembled and maintained pursuant to
the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1946.47 This
stockpile is intended to obviate dependence by the United States
upon overseas foreign sources for strategic or critical supplies
during a limited or general 'var. A minimum stockpile objective is
established for each stockpiled item upon the assumption that some
imports will be available from overseas sources during a war. A
maximum objective for each item is also established upon the
assumption that overseas supplies are cut off but access exists to
some supplies from nearby foreign sources. Military, atomic energy,

defense support and critical civilian needs are included in the
estimate. An emergency of three years is assumed.48
~A fifth inventory, consisting wholly of tin, the remaining stock of tin
refined while the United States operated the Texas City smelter, and held by
the Federal Facilities Corporation, was liquidated in January 1962, and is not
included in the estimates in this book.
47 60 Stat. 496 (1946). This law superseded the earlier stockpiling act passed
in 1939.
48 Until1958 the estimated emergency was 5 years.
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The Defense Production Act Stockpile (DPA Stockpile) is accumulated pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950.49 While
materials may be transferred from the DPA Stockpile to the
National Stockpile if the President deems this action necessary in
the public interest, the dominant Congressional intention in establishing the stockpile was to provide an incentive for the expansion of
industrial capacity and raw materials sources through the purchase of materials.
Policies for the National and DPA Stockpiles are established by
the Office of Emergency Planning in Defense Mobilization Order
V-7. The policies set forth in this Order, and any future policy
changes, are formulated with the advice of interested government
agencies channeled through an Interdepartmental Material Advisory Committee (IMAC).
The Departments of Defense, State, Agriculture, Commerce and
Interior, the General Services Administration, Agency for International Development and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration have representatives on IMAC. Observers attend
from the Bureau of the Budget, the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Small Business Administration. The Chairman of IMAC
is from the Office of Emergency Planning.
Purchases for the National and DP A Stockpiles are made by the
General Services Administration in accordance with plans of the
Office of Emergency Planning. For the National Stockpile purchase
program, the items and amounts are stated in detail in the plan,
with an indication of the amounts to be purchased in each fiscal
year, the total amount to be purchased and the number of years
required. Defense Production Act Program directives are less
specific, indicating only the funds available for a resource expansion
program and criteria for purchases.
Withdrawals of materials from the National and DP A Stockpiles are also by the General Services Administration. The procedures
are complex and are set forth both by Acts of Congress and in
Defense Mobilization Order V-7 issued by the Office of Emergency
Planning.
The President may order withdrawals from the National Stockpile
when, in his judgment, this is necessary for the "common defense"
or "in time of war or during a national emergency with respect
to common defense proclaimed by the President." These withdrawals
may be for use, sale, "or other disposition." 50
4965 Stat. 801 (1950).
50 60 Stat. 598 (1946) section 5.
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This authority has been delegated by the President to the Office
of Emergency Planning, to be exercised by the Director of the
Office in releasing materials "in such quantities, for such uses, and
on such terms and conditions~' as the Director determines "to be
necessary in the interests of national defense." 51 The Attorney
General has ruled that this power does not include authority to
release gem diamonds in exchange for industrial dia.monds on economic grounds alone when the common defense is not involved. 52
Materials can be removed, however, to be upgraded or rotated
with substituted materials to prevent loss through deterioration.
When material in the National Stockpile is determined to be excess
because of a revised deter1nination of projected need, there can be no
disposition until the Office of Emergency Planning gives it approval The operating plans for disposition are then prepared by
the General Services Administration. Defense Mobilization Order
V-7, paragraph 14, states that the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning will authorize the disposition when there can be
avoided: serious disruption of the usual markets of producers,
processors and consumers; adverse effects on the international interests of the United States or upon domestic employment and labor
disputes; and loss to the United States.
If the removal from the stockpile is for a purpose other than
direct use of a government agency, the Departments of Interior,
Commerce, State, Agriculture, Defense·, Labor and other government agencies and private industries concerned must be consulted.
The Departments of State and Interior may be able to block the
disposition if, within thirty days after consultation, they object to
the plan. The disposition is halted if the Director of the Office of
Emergency Planning concurs in the objection. If the Director does
not concur, the matter must be referred to the President for decision.
When the Office of Emergency Planning directs disposition of
excess property from the National Stockpile, notice must be published in the F ed.eral Register and notice must also be given to the
Congress and to the Armed Services Committees of each House.
The notices must state the reason for the revised determination, the
item and amount to be released, the plan for disposition and the date
upon which the material will become available for sale or transfer.
No disposition can be made until six months after the date of each
notice; and then not until the Congress by joint resolution has
consented to the disposition.
51 20 Federal Register 7637 (Oct. 11, 1955) ; 23 Federal Register· 5061 (July 1,
1958) ; 23 Fed·eral Register 6971 (Sept. 8, 1958).
52 41 Op. Att. Gen., April 27, 1954.
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Congressional consent is not required i£ the revised determination
is because the material to be released is obsolescent, is o£ no further
usefulness or has deteriorated. The other requirements, such as
notices and time intervals, are retained.53
Dispositions from the Defense Production Act Stockpile require
no notice in the Federal Register or notice to the Congress. The
consent o£ Congress is unnecessary and there is no waiting period.
Public notice o£ the disposition is required by Defense Mobilization
Order V-7, paragraph 15. This requirement is satisfied by a press
release.
Other requirements are the same as for dispositions from the
National Stockpile. I£ the materials are resold, rather than used
by the government agencies which look to the DPA stockpile for
critical and strategic materials which they consume directly, the
materials cannot be sold for less than the current domestic market
price. 54
A third inventory, the "Supplemental Stockpile" is controlled
by the Department o£ Agriculture and the Office o£ Emergency
Planning jointly. The Department o£ Agriculture determines the
materials which go into the stockpile. These materials are obtained
by the use o£ foreign currency acquired through the sale o£ surplus
agricultural commodities pursuant to Section 104(b) o£ the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act o£ 1954,55 or by
barter o£ surplus agricultural commodities pursuant to the Agricultural Acto£ 1956. 56
Strategic or other materials acquired for barter must be placed in
the Supplemental Stockpile "unless acquired for the National stockpile * * * or for 'other purpose'." The "other purposes" are defined
as "foreign economic or military aid or assistance programs, * * *
offshore construction programs, or * * * the requirements o£ Government agencies."
Approximately 90% o£ the strategic and other materials acquired
by the Department o£ Agriculture have been by barter. The Department is assisted in selecting the· materials and in determining prices
by a Supplemental Stockpile Advisory Committee, having representatives from the Office of Emergency Planning, Departments
A convenient exposition of these procedures with a collection of most of the
relevant statutes and regulations may bQ found in Inquiry into the Strategic
and Critical Material Stockpiles of the United States (Hearings before the
National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves Subcommittee of the Committee <;m Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. Part 1, 1962).
54 64 Stat. 801 ( 1950) section 303; 65 Stat. 133 ( 1951) section 103 (a).
55 68 Stat. 456 (1954).
56 70 Stat. 200 (1956) section 207.
5S
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of the Interior, Commerce, 'Treasury and State, the General Services
Administration, Bureau of the Budget and Agency for International
Development. The Department of Defense and Atomic Energy
Commission have observers.
Removals of materials from the Supplementary Stockpile are
subject to the same limitations as removals from the National
Stockpile. No statute expressly authorizes the President to order
transfers of materials from the Supplemental Stockpile to the
National Stockpile, although this authority may be implied fron1
Section 4 (h) of the Charter of the Commodity Credit Corporation
as amended in 1949.57
This may be the only method of removal from the Supplemental
Stockpile except for items deter1nined obsolescent or obsolete.
Section 3 (e) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling
Act 58 has been interpreted to prevent authorizations by the Office
of Emergency Planning for the disposition of materials determined
to be in excess of needs. Section 3 (e) refers to a "revised" determination. By the administrative view there can be no "revised" determination by the Office of Emergency Planning because the Department of Agriculture makes the initial determination to place the
material in the stockpile. 59 Until this section is amended by the
Congress or more liberally interpreted by the Office of Emergency
Planning the Supplemental Stockpile appears to be a dead end for
strategic and critical materials unless these are released by the
President or the Office of Emergency Planning pursuant to the
emergency power.
Until strategic or critical materials obtained by the Department of
Agriculture reach the National or Supplemental Stockpiles, the
items are carried in a fourth inventory, described as the Commodity
Credit Corporation or "Pipeline" Stockpile. The Commodity Credit
Corporation is a corporate agency within the Department of Agriculture and subject to the general supervision of the Secretary
of Agriculture through a corporate board of directors and officers.
The powers conferred upon the Corporation to dispose of its
property, including strategic and critical materials, are quite general. Critical and strategic materials acquired by the Corporation
57 63 Stat. 154 (1949) section 2 (amending section 4(h) of Commodity Credit
Corporation Charter Act) .
58 60 Stat. 496 (1946). This law superseded the earlier stockpiling act passed
in 1939.
59 See Inquiry into the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiles of the
United States (Hearings Before the National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum
Reserves Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. Part 4, 1962), 1014-1015; 1351-1352.
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by barter must be for the National Stockpile, the Supplemental
Stockpile, for foreign economic or military aid or assist ance programs, for offshore construction programs, or "to meet the requirements of government agencies.~' 60
There seems no legal obstacle to a release of items held in the
"Pipeline" Stockpile upon Presidential order or simply when a
"government agency" needs the materials and can reimburse t he
Commodity Credit Corporation. No Congressional action or waiting
period need be involved nor need there be public notice of the release.
Currently available from the stockpiles are 58,000 long tons of
refined tin ingot. The Congress has authorized disposition of 50,000
long tons of this amount from the National Stockpile.
With respect to tin from this stockpile, however, the President
is committed not only to consultations with Bolivia. and other tin
producing countries before sale but also to a scheme of sale which
will avoid depressing the international market price of tin.61 There
is no similar commitment concerning the 8,000 long tons of refined
oo Barter of agricultural commodities for strategic and other materials not
subject to rapid deterioration commenced in 1950 pursuant to the 1949 a mendment to the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter. 63 Stat. 154 (1949) section
2. About $107,000,000 in strategic and critical materials were acquired between
1950 and 1954. The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,
68 Stat. 454 (usually called P.L. 480) created the Supplemental Stockpile as a
place for deposit for -materials received in exchange for foreign currencies. The
Agricultural Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 200 (1956) section 206 authorized transfer
of bartered materials to the Supplemental Stockpile. The general dispositive
power of the Commodity Credit Corporation from the Pipeline Stockpile rests
upon 73 Stat. 611 (1959) section 204 and 70 Stat. 200 (1956) section 206.
61 See 45 Department of State Bulletin, 772 (1961). The President's message
to the President of Bolivia states in part:
* * * The course of action which we have suggested is the sale of small
lots of tin over a period of several years. This tin would come from the
50,000 tons which we now have in excess of our strategic requirements.
'Ve do not intend to depress the price of tin through these sales; they
would be initiated at a time of world-wide shortage and would have the
effect of discouraging tin consumers from substituting other materials for
their normal tin consumption. In this way we can protect the long-run
stability and continued prosperity of the tin market. * * *
The United States commenced a trial plan for the disposition of a maximum
200 tons per week in September 1962. About 30 tons of this was used in foreign
aid programs and about 10 tons for use by U.S. Government agencies.
In the disposition of the remaining weekly quota, GSA accepted only bids
reasonably consistent with prevailing market prices and regulated sales to
avoid depressing the market prices. After consultation with a delegation of the
International Tin Council and major tin producing states the interim program
was extended durin~ the first quarter of 1963. See 47 Department of State
Bulletin, 386 (1962) ; 47 Departmoot of State Bulletin, 1012 (1962) ; 48 Department of State Bulletin, 182 (1963).
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ingot in the Pipeline Stockpile. In a disposition o£ this surplus tin
the Bolivian economy would have to be safeguarded.

Dumping Tin in Antiokan 11/arkets
It is therefore possible to take advantage o£ the publicity and
state o£ apprehension o£ tin producers stemming £rom the Congressional authorization £or disposition o£ the 50,000 long tons o£
refined tin ingot in theN atio.nal Stockpile by proposing to Gondomar
that unless he ceases his supply of Salvaje all or part o£ the tin
in the Pipeline Stockpile will be dumped in Antiokan tin markets.
A proposal to dump this surplus tin only in the United States
markets o£ Antioka should place sufficient pressure upon Gondomar
to obtain the decision desired.
An unpublicized statement o£ intention, coupled with disclosure to
Gondomar o£ the speed o£ action possible under United States law,
are desirable £or maximum effect. I£ the plan proposed to Gondoma.r
must be executed to apply the requisite pressure, collateral action will
then be necessary to protect the Bolivian economy and to avoid
damage to the tin miners o£ An tioka.
The advantages in a plan o£ economic warfare involving dumping
refined tin ingot £rom the Pipeline Stockpile are: (1) Speed,
domestic law requiring no appreciable delay; (2) Direction, Gondomar's personal financial interests in the Antiokan tin industry
being at stake; ( 3) Adequate a.mbit o£ arrest, the side effects o£ the
sortie being subject to offset by the use o£ foreign aid; and ( 4)
Adequate sustentive range, there being no apparent obstacle to
further action which might be taken against Gondomar i£ the action
contemplated proves ineffective.
Although the United States has cooperated with the International
Tin Council in maintaining tin prices, the United States is not a
party to the International Tin Agreement o£ 1960.62 In the "Sugar
Encounter" with Cuba, discussed in Chapter II, freedom o£ action
by the United States was restricted because of its participation in
the International Sugar Agreement o£ 1948.63
For example, i£ the United States were a party to the International
Tin Agreement of 1960, it would be required to give six months'
public notice before it disposed o£ a noncommercial stock o£ tin. 64
The requirement is to protect consumers and producers £rom avoidable disruption o£ their usual markets. A provision similar to this
62 EjCONF.32j5. Second International Tin Agreement, United Nations Tin
Conference, Summary of Proceedings (1960) 25.
6310 TIAS 2189 (1959).
64 The Tin Council may consent to reduction of the notice period.
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is incorporated in the United States domestic law for dispositions
from the National Stockpile; but the United States has assumed
no general international obligation to avoid rapid dispositions or to
give advance notice of transfers of tin from all of its stockpiles.
Had such an obligation been assumed, the speed required for an
effective economic sortie against Gondomar probably could not be
developed.
It is possible, of course, that if the United States were a party
to the International Tin Agreement of 1960 an exception might be
found to permit action with the necessary speed. Article XVI (1) (b)
of the Tin Agreement, for example, permits a participating country
to take any action "singly or with other countries" which it considers necessary to protect its essential security interests when such
action "relates to traffic in arms, ammunition or implements of
war. * * *"
In this instance action by the United States is to interrupt trade
in military supplies between Antioka and an insurgent in Nueva
by bringing pressure upon Gondomar 'vho is the person who can
make the decision to bring the traffic to an end. A strong argument
may also be offered that the traffic in arms affects the essential
security interests of the United States and other ·countries of the
Western Hemisphere.
The existence of a viable International Tin Agreement, on the
other hand, creates a market environment 'vhich favors action by
the United States against Gondomar. The impact of action by the
United States upon Gondomar may be reduced to a degree because
if the action affects the world-market price to such an extent that
the price falls within "the lower sector of the range between the
floor and ceiling prices" established by the Agreement, the Manager
of the buffer stock may buy cash tin on the London Metal Exchange.65 The Tin Council can also establish "control periods"
during which maximum export amounts are established in order
to maintain prices. 66
Action of this nature pursuant to the Agreement may work to
the advantage of Gondomar. At the same time, action by the United
States is favored because the existence and effective operation of
a price control regime 'viii tend to damper price repercussions
other than in the United States markets of Antioka. The Agreement is a "cushion'~ which tends to extend the ambit of arrest of the
side effects of manipulations of the tin trade in economic warfare.
Second International Tin Agreement, Art. IX(2) (d). If the price is in the
"middle sector of the range" as defined by the Agreement, the :Manager cannot
buy unless the Tin Council makes the decision.
66 Ibid., Art. VII (2) (a).
65
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T he GATT 67 does not appear to limit action by the United States
to restrict the Antiokan tin market by disposing of all or part
of the surplus tin in the P ipeline Stockpile. Currently there is no
t ariff or tax on tin, although if a discriminatory tax or tariff should
be proposed as a measure to be taken against Gondomar, this action
would have to be justified under one of the exceptions which GATT
provides. 68
The only GATT provision concerning dumping commodities :from
a National Stockpile is contained in Article XX(11) (c). This provision is applicable to stockpile surpluses accumulated as a result
of World War II, a deadline of J anuary 1, 1951, being established
:for liquidation of these holdings, with a stipulation :for extension
of the time in certain cases. Tin accumulated during World War II
is held in the National Stockpile ; but the tin in the Pipeline Stockpile was acquired after World W ar II by the barter o£ surplus
commodities.
T he action which the United States, as a party to GATT, might
take against the Marshall bears an analogy to the routine contemporary market operations of t he "state trader." A state trader
enjoys a. competitive advantage over private rivals in :foreign trade
because o£ its ability to undersell.
A rticle XVII o£ GATT is the provision aimed at state trading
enterprises. This obligates the state trader to "act in a manner consistent with the general principles of nondiscriminatory treatment"
prescribed in the Agreement ":for governmental measures affecting
imports or exports by private traders." The state trader must also
"make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations, including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase of sale, and
shall afford the enterprises of any other contracting parties adequate
opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to
compete :for participation in such purchases or sales."
The Interpretative Notes 69 state marketing boards engaged in
purchasing or selling are subject to t he provisions of Article XVII.
Par agraph 2 of Article XVII states, however, that restrictions in
~ the Article do not apply to imports of products :for immediate or
ultimate consumption in governmental use and not :for resale or for
use in the production of goods :for sale.
T wo criteria thus appear to condition application of Article XVII:
(1) I s the state actively engaged in competition with private enter61 Stat. Part 5, A-ll (1947).
I bid., Art. XX (General Exceptions) ; Art. XXI (Security Exceptions).
oo 61 Stat. Part 5, A-89 (1947).
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prise in the trade in question? ( 2) Was the commodity in question
obtained to place it on the market in competition \vith private entrepreneurs? With respect to activity o£ the Commodity Credit Corporation in obtaining tin by barter for the Pipeline Stockpile, both
questions must be answered in the negative. The tin in question was
imported for governmental use, the bulk being received in barter for
other commodities. The tin has become available for disposition
only after a bona fide redetermination o£ the strategic requirements
of the United States £or this metal.
I£ GATT should be construed to apply to the measures contemplated against Gondomar, the United States might invoke the
security exception upon which the exception in the International
Tin Agreement was substantially modeled. This exception permits a
contracting party to take action which it considers necessary £or the
protection o£ its essential security interests " * * * relating to the
traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly £or the purpose o£ supplying a military establishment * * *." 70
I£ the United States proposes action to disrupt Gondomar's market
for tin in the United States, or undertakes this action with a view to
interrupting the arms trade with Salvaje, there appears to be no
violation o£ the Charter o£ the Organization of American States or
of the Charter of the United Nations. Neither charter precludes all
economic action of a coercive nature.
Athough Article 16 o£ the OAS Charter prohibits the use of coercive measures of an econo1nic character to force the will o£ another
state, this "forcing" is prohibited only when "unilateral advantages"
o£ any kind are sought. There is no prohibition of economic action to
frustrate an intervention o£ the type prohibited in Article 15; and
Gondomar is intervening in N uevan internal affairs in violation o£
this Article.
A constriction of the market for Antiokan tin in the United States
is a "peaceful" means of action, analogous as previously indicated
to practices habitually employed by the "state trader." The United
·7o 61 Stat. Part 5, A-63 (1947) Art. XXI. Other security demands excepted
relate to fissio~able materials or the materials from which they are derived,
action taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, and
action taken pursuant to the obligations of a state under the UN Charter for
the maintenance of international peace and security. It is possible that action
by the United States against Gondomar might also be justified under the latter
two exceptions. The "military establishment" mentioned in Article XXI ( ii) is
not further elaborated in the interpretative notes. There is nothing in the
Article which clearly restricts the words to the "military establishment" of the
state which takes action otherwise in violation of the GATT but permissible
under the exception.
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States action proposed against Gondomar is to secure ''international
peace, security and justice" rather than to endanger these aspirations
as mentioned in Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter. No threat
or use of force is made against the territorial integrity or political
independence of Antioka as mentioned in Article 2(4); and it is
consistent with the purposes of the United Nations to maintain the
status quo politically until a dispute of a peculiarly dangerous nature
can be considered by the Organ of Consultation of the Organization
of American States.

Manipulation of Trade in
Wheat, Textiles and Hard Goods
In contrast to the proposed manipulation of the Antiokan tin
market in the United States, manipulations of the trade with Antioka
in wheat, textiles and hard goods are subject to several of the difficulties observed in manipulations of foreign aid in economic warfare.
The effect upon the critical decision maker ( Gondomar) may be
indirect, the ultimate effect upon the Marshal requiring more time
than can be reasonably considered for expenditure under the circumstances. A reduction in exports of wheat to Antioka, and possibly
an embargo on other shipments as well, are likely to strike at consumer groups within Antioka lacking access to political channels
through which Gondomar can be influenced.
A reduction in exports of textiles or hard goods might affect industrial interests in Antioka. The persons affected by this reduction
would be likely to have more influence upon Gondomar than would
agricultural, mining or industrial workers deprived of wheat. Gondomar might be affected personally by blocking trade in textiles or
hard goods. But the impact of trade restrictions upon these articles
clearly will have a delayed effect which manipulations of the Antiokan tin trade will a void.
The ambit of arrest of the side effects of manipulations of the
trade in wheat, textiles and hard goods also ,viii be limited. No wave
of sympathy is ever generated, and positive hostility is usually provoked, by denials of food to people who need it. When economic warfare is used as a secondary policy device (supporting the use of
physical violence) denials of food to persons by means of a blockade
or preemption of supplies are sometimes grudgingly tolerated. These
food denials, on the other hand, are almost never forgotten and tend
to taint interstate relations for generations.
When economic warfare is used as a primary policy device, the
flow of food and medical supplies to a target state should not be
manipulated. Humanitarian considerations are a sufficient justifica-
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tion. But if a policy maker is not s'vayed by these, he may be persuaded by the threat of the future communications barrier which
food denials tend to erect.
The side effects of manipulations of the trade in textiles and hard
goods are likely to be paramount within the industrial establishment
of the exporting state. \Vhile reductions in 'vheat exports may be
compensated in the United States by government purchases of wheat
surpluses, the impacts upon textile and hard goods industries when a
foreign market is disturbed are likely to be severe.
It is difficult to maintain an internal stable price and income structure and regularly paced production when the government concerned
does not also seek to avoid violent gyrations in foreign trade. The
internal effect of violent external economic disturbance can be lessened when the internal economy is fully state controlled as in the
Soviet Union. But where state control is partial, as in the United
States, external economic disturbances, whether intended or not, disturb the internal economy of the acting state.
The sustentive range of economic action by manipulations of the
trade in wheat, textiles and hard goods is also limited. If the trade
in wheat is interrupted, Antioka may turn to the International Wheat
Council for supplies of wheat pursuant to Article 11 ( 1) of the International "\Vheat Agreement of 1962. 71 This demand could be satisfied
unless there was a significant international wheat shortage, although
there might be a supply hiatus due to the shipment time from sources
other than the United States. The wheat reserves in Antioka might
be sufficient to bridge this time gap.
Antioka also might turn to the Soviet Union or Scythia for its
trade in textiles and hard goods and ultimately reorient its markets.
Gondomar could certainly bring pressure to bear upon American
manufacturers denied access to Antiokan markets; and these persons
in turn could bring force to bear upon the Executive Branch and
Congress to erode an economic warfare policy designed to disrupt
Gondomar's trade with Salvaje. Additional supporting action which
appeared necessary against Gondomar might prove awkward because
of this reciprocal pressure.
From a legal viewpoint, there are no domestic objections to manipulations of the trade in wheat, textiles or hard goods. This trade
can be interrupted under the Export Control Act of 1949 72 or under
Section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917.73 But t he
TIAS 5115 (1962).
63 Stat. 7 ( 1949) .
73 40 Stat. 411 (1917); 54 Stat.179 (1940). The Export Control and Trading
With the Enemy Acts were discussed in detail in Chapter II.
71
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United States may encounter an international legal obstacle in manipulating the trade in wheat.
Under the International Wheat Agreement of 1962,74 to which the
United States and Antioka are parties, datum quantities of wheat
are established for each crop year by the International Wheat Council for each exporting state (the United States) with respect to all
importing countries (Antioka). The International Wheat Council
may, in its discretion, require exporting and importing countries to
cooperate to insure the availability for purchase by importing countries after January 31st of each crop year of an amount of wheat
equal to not less than 10% of the datum quantities of exporting
countries for any crop year. Although the United States has votes
as a member of the Council, it is not a free agent in manipulating
its exports of wheat.
There is no security exception in the International Wheat Agreement of 1962 similar to the exception in the International Tin Agreement of 1960. The only provision relative to security permits an
exporting or importing state to withdraw from the Agreement if it
"considers its national security to be endangered by the outbreak of
hostilities." 75 The state concerned must give thirty days written
notice of its withdrawal to the United States or must apply to the
International Wheat Council for a suspension of its obligations
under the Agreement. The United States is depository state for
ratifications, accessions and withdrawals.
The combined defects of indirection, limited ambit of arrest and
limited sustenti ve range suggest manipulations of the trade with
Antioka in wheat, textiles and hard goods may mature into a fruitless
policy of protracted harassment. A policy of protracted harassment.
would induce no decision of the nature which Gondomar is desired
to make; would expend too much time; might drive Antioka to
other sources of supply; and might prove injurious to the economy
of the United States. These alternatives on the whole appear less
desirable than manipulations of foreign aid, and certainly appear
less desirable than operations against the Antiokan tin market in
the United States.
Suggested Solution: Situation 5

There should be no assumption that a wealth weapon is the most
desirable policy device to induce Gondomar to interrupt his trade
with Salvaje. But if a wealth weapon is selected, the first United
States move should relate to the Antiokan tin market.
74TJA.S 5115 (1962), Art.17(5).
75 Ibid., Art. 36 ( 7) .
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This appears to be the only area for wealth pressure in which the
effect upon Marshal Gondomar will be immediate rather than indirect. A quick impact can therefore be anticipated. The existence of
the Buffer Stock 1naintained pursuant to the International T in
Agreement of 1960 will insure a degree of price stability in the world
market and provide an acceptable ambit of arrest of t he side effects
of use of the weapon contemplated. The sustentive range seems adequate, foreign aid manipulations in particular being available to
follow-up action upon the tin market if supporting action becomes
necessary.
As a first step in the program of economic warfare, Gondomar
should be informed privately that his tin market in the United
States will be disrupted unless he ceases his assistance to Salvaje.
Facts should be placed before him to insure that he appreciates these
features of his environment: ( 1) The current conditions of the
world tin market; (2) The importance to him of his United States
market; and ( 3) The speed with which United States officials can
move to disturb his market under domestic and international law.
It is probable that Gondomar will cease his support of Savaje
when he appreciates the directness and speed with 'vhich the United
States is prepared to move. If, however, the Marshal does not make
the desired decision promptly, refined tin ingot should be withdrawn
from the Pipeline Stockpile and sold to his United States customers
at prices below any the Marshal can offer.
The United States must be prepared to cease these withdrawals
and sales on short notice and to support the economies of friendly
countries injured by these sales. In aid to Antioka care should be
taken to avoid compensating aid to Gondomar. Payments to the
Commodity Credit Corporation for the tin withdrawn should be
made from unearmarked funds appropriated for foreign aid and
other purposes.
B. NAVAL INTERDICTION OF SUPPLY LINES IN SUPPORT OF
DIPLOMATIC ACTION
Situation 6

After the. conference in Situation 5, in which our Naval Commander at Ooloso participated, our Minister to Antioka submitted
his report and recommendation to the Department of State. Thereafter the Minister was instructed to request an immediate meeting
with Marshal Gondomar.
On the day following this meeting, REVARMCO was dissolved
by its stockholders. Its assets were sold by sealed bids. The Antiokan
Government was sole bidder.
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At its meeting requested by Cortez, the Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as an Organ of Consultation, appointed an investigating committee for an inspection
on the spot.
Members of this Committee and its staff were excluded by Salvaje
from Luna Mountain areas occupied by the PDS Army. Based upon
the only observations possible, the Committee reported no further
activity by Gondomar in Nueva.
The Committee estimated Scythian personnel supporting PDS
forces at approximately 1,000. Scythia was said to have placed much
equipment, including 14 trawlers manned by Scythian personnel, at
Salvaje's disposal.
During the Committee investigation, and while military action in
Nueva was at a standstill, Cortez, in a radio and television address
from Dolores, announced he and his Cabinet had resigned for the
welfare of the people of Nueva and to a void further internal conflict.
He urged his listeners not to resist movement of the PDS forces to
Dolores.
On the next day Salvaje flew to Dolores and took office as Provisional President. He promised future popular elections. Cortez and
his Cabinent were arrested. Numerous officers of the N uevan armed
services have been dismissed.
Due to the puzzling circumstances of the Cortez collapse, our Minister to Nueva was recalled for consultation. He has presented to the
National Security Council the following facts.
On 25 November, shortly before the resignation of Cortez, General
Valens, a N uevan national, recently returned from Scythia and now
Chief of Staff of the PDS Army, met with the N uevan Ministers of
Defense and Health under a flag of truce. V alens informed these
officials that Scythian biological warfare units supporting the PDS
Army would commence action against N uevan Armed Forces and
the civilian population controlled by the Cortez Government. If
Cortez and his Cabinet resigned by midnight, 27 November, and
supported Salvaje's assumption of office as Provisional President no
biological warfare would be commenced.
The two Ministers accompanied Valens to the Luna Mountain
area. There they observed aerosolizing equipment emplaced in bombproof shelters and mounted on Scythian trawlers in adjacent waters;
stockpiles of aerosolized pneumonic plague bacilli, sulfadiazine,
respirators and protective clothing; and prisoners from the jail at
P atricio, who had been exposed to aerosolized pneumonic plague
bacilli.
'T he Ministers reported to Cortez. At a meeting of Cortez and his
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Cabinet with the commanders of the Nuevan Armed Forces it was
concluded that air strikes with conventional explosives could not
destroy sufficient biological warfare munitions to forestall the
threatened attack. Nuclear weapons were not available.
The weather forecast for three weeks favored a biological attack
launched by aerosols from the Luna Mountains or adjacent coastal
areas in the direction of Dolores. Supplies of sulfadiazine could not
be obtained and distributed, nor could an immunization program
be completed, in time to a void massive casualties.
Under these circumstances, President Cortez and his Cabinet
decided to capitulate and resign.
During this meeting with the United States Minister to Nueva, the
National Security Council considered also these intelligence items
derived from reliable sources.
(1) In return for support given him by Scythia, Salvaje has
agreed to Scythian use of Farrago Island, a N uevan possession fifteen
miles off its coast, as a proving ground for biological munitions. He
has also agreed to permit Scythia to stockpile biological munitions
useful in economic warfare (against livestock and crops) in the Luna
Mountains. These stockpiles are to remain under Scythian control.
(2) Experiments are being conducted by Scythia on Farrago with
an aerosolized yellow fever virus. The aerosol technique bypasses
the mosquito as a vector and permits effective use of the munition in
temperate or cold climates in any season.
(3) Seven Scythian trawlers, equipped with aerosolizing nozzles,
have been observed by naval air and submarine patrols conducting
attack delivery maneuvers at ranges of from 250 to 300 miles off the
Virginia and Maryland coasts. It is estimated that Scythia can
deliver biological warfare materials in aerosols with favorable winds
at ranges of from 500 to 600 miles.
( 4) On 8 December, experiments were conducted by a Scythian
trawler off Farrago with aresolized Melioidosis-B. Melioidosis, caused
by the bacillus malleomyces pseudomallei, is similar to glanders but
has a higher fatality rate. Melioidosis was first observed in the Orient
and approximately 400 cases have been reported since the disease
was identified.
Melioidosis.:B, a mutant of Melioidosis, was developed by Scythia
for use against livestock in economic warfare. The 50% lethal dose
(LD5o) is believed to be 23.5 bacilli. Death results in approximately
six hours after infection.
The trawler delivered Melioidosis-B from an average range of five
miles during a run of approximately ten miles. All sheep on Farrago,
placed there for the experiment, re.ceived a lethal dose. Although
Scythia had considered the lethal effect of ~Ielioidosis- B limited to
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livestock, one hundred and thirty Amerindians, the only humans on
the Island, also died.
Aerosol delivered by the trawler was wind borne over parts of
Nueva, Cases of Melioidosis-B in humans and livestock have been
reported unofficially, although Salvaje has attempted to suppress this
information. Antioka, also in the aerosol path, has reported several
suspected cases of Melioidosis-B in humans and livestock to the Pan
American Sanitary Bureau and the World Health Organization.
Cui tures taken from these suspected cases are being examined in the
Pan American Zoonoses Center in Azul, Argentina.
Based on these facts, the President alerted the United States
Public Health Service and the Department of Agriculture and ordered close naval surveillance of Scythian trawlers operating in the
Caribbean and in waters off the eastern coast of the United States
within biological striking range by wind-borne aerosols ( 600 miles).
During the month follo\ving this meeting of the National Security
Council, United States intelligence agencies reported a regular and
heavy flow of biological \Varfare equipment and personnel from
Scythia to Nueva by sea and air. These shipments included pneumonic plague and Melioidosis-B biological warfare munitions.
Aerosolized yellow fever virus has been perfected by Scythia in
Nueva and is now being stockpiled there. The Scythian biological
warfare stockpiles, have been dispersed in caves and underground
shelters and probably are secure against nuclear attack. These stockpiles remain under Scythian control. Forty-six Scythian trawlers,
carrying aerosolizing equipment, now operate out of N uevan ports.
On 16 May, Marshal Gondomar, President of Antioka, informed
the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States
that on the night of 10 May units of the N uevan Navy, supported
by Scythian biological warfare specialists, commenced biological warfare against Antioka by dispensing contaminated aerosols from surface vessels. Pneumonic plague, Melioidosis-B and yello\v fever have
thus far been unidentified. The presence of N uevan vessels was
detected by radar. No defensive action was taken because the attack
was not discovered until massive outbreaks of the diseases oceurred.
At the time of his message to the Chairman of the Council,
Marshal Gondomar ordered the Antiokan air force to sink all
Nuevan naval craft and Scythian tra\vlers within striking range by
aerosols ( 600 miles) of Antioka. He requested the assistance of
members of the Organization of American States to meet an armed
attack pursuant to Article 3 (2) of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact). He also requested an immediate
meeting of the Organ of Consultation pursuant to Articles 3(2) and
6 of this Treaty.
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The Council of the Organization of American States, acting pro visionally as an Organ of Consultation, debated Marshal Gondomar's
charge for six days. Salvaje has denied any attack with biological
·weapons was launched. Gondomar's charge has been confirmed by
reports from Coloso, and N uevan troops and landing craft have
assembled in N uevan ports.
Influential members of the Organization of American States believe the outbreaks of disease in Antioka may be due to Scythian
experiments at Farrago or to Marshal Gondomar's o'vn experiments,
which he is believed to have undertaken. For this reason the Organ
is not prepared to approve unilateral measures of military support
for Antioka or collective measures under Article 2(2) of the Rio
Pact.
The Organ also has failed to conclude under Article 6 that an
aggression "which is not an armed attack" ha~ occurred. A situation
which might endanger the peace o:f America has been found. The
Organ is thus prepared to call upon "the contending states to suspend
hostilities and restore the status quo ante bellum."
Hostilities, in fact, are in a stalemate since all of the Antiokan aircraft 'vhich sortied against Nuevan naval units and Scythian trawlers
have been destroyed. Marshal Gondomar is unwilling to risk his
surface vessels and single submarine. Medical teams and supplies
have been sent to Antioka by the United States and other members of
the Organization of American States.
Under these circumstances, the President of the United States has
received a letter from the President of Scythia, which states that
Scythia, supporting Salvaje's demand for abandonment by the
United States of its Naval Base at Coloso, is restraining with difficulty the Nuevan Navy from attacks upon the continental United
States. Scythia cannot guarantee the effectiveness of these restraints
so long as the threat to Nuevan security posed by the United States
Naval Base at Coloso continues.
It is known Salvaje desires abandonment of the base at Coloso to
insure the success of any attack which he launches against Antioka.
The only threat which the Nuevan Navy could offer to the continental United States is a threat to attack with biological weapons.
These weapons can be obtained only from Scythian personnel and
can be delivered in substantial quantities only with Scythian
equipment.
On 22 May, a Scythian dispatch to the senior Scythian officer in
Nueva was disclosed to United States intelligence personnel. This
message stated: "Execute Plan CHOLERA 022400 June." Plan
CHOLERA is known to embrace release to Nuevan control of
biological warfare materials together with trawlers and aircraft
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equipped to deliver these materials in aerosols. The Plan also includes
provision of Scythian biological warfare personnel to act under
N uevan orders.
The National Security Council has grounds for believing Scythia
is encouraging Salvaje to make a biological warfare attack upon the
eastern coast of the United States. If such an attack is delivered
by a small number of vessels at night, it is likely to be approximately
one week before medical diagnostic procedures can verify an attack
has occurred.
Scythia can then place pressure upon the United States to give up
the Base at Coloso by offering to withhold biological warfare materials from Nueva in return for this concession ; or ean force the
United States into an attack upon Nueva at a time when the Organ
of Consultation of A1nerican States is not convinced that the outbreaks of disease are due to intentional biological attacks.
To forestall the necessity for an attack upon the biological stockpiles and delivery means in Nueva with ultradecisive weapons, the
National Security Council will recommend to the President that
naval action be taken to interdict the traffic to and from Nueva in
biological warfare munitions and equipment and to exclude the
movement from and into N uevan territorial waters and airspace of
vessels or aircraft equipped for dispensing contaminated aerosols.
This draft proclamation is now being considered.
A PROCLAMATION

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United
States are threatened by the establishment in Nueva by Scythia of
stockpiles of biological warfare munitions and facilities for their
clandestine deli very ;
Whereas these munitions have been used against Antioka by Nueva
in violation of the obligations of Nueva assumed under the Charter
of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American
States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assis~ance; and
by Scythia in violation of its obligations assumed under the Charter
of the United Nations; and by both Nueva and Scythia in violation
of minimum standards of humanitarian conduct accepted by civilized
nations;
Whereas on this date the Government of the United States has
placed before the Security Council of the United Nations its complaint that Nueva and Scythia have threatened a breach of the peace
and contemplate an armed attack with biological weapons to coerce
the United States to terminate its viable treaty with Antioka, providing for United States naval facilities at Coloso, Antioka;
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Whereas an attack by unknown biological munitions cannot be
met by conventional defensive measures of the type contemplated by
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;
Whereas it is necessary to preserve the status q_uo of biological
warfare munitions and means for their delivery in Nueva pending a
peaceful resolution of the issue presented in the complaint of the
United States by the Security Council or other organs of the United
Nat ions or by other diplomatic processes;
Whereas it is also necessary to procure current information required for peaceful settlement of this dispute pending reception,
free access to information and effective functioning of a United
Nations Commission of Inquiry or other independent commission of
inquiry within the territory of Nueva;
Now, Therefore I ____________________ , President of the United
States of America, acting pursuant to authority conferred upon me
by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, in accordance
with obligations assumed by the United States as a party to the
Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of
American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, and to defend the security of the United States, do
hereby proclaim that all forces under my command are ordered,
beginning at Greenwich time, June ____ 19 __ , to establish a zone
of surveillance on the high seas and superjacent airspace in the
region defined by Article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and to interdict within this zone such biological warfare munitions and facilities for their delivery as shall be defined by
the Secretary of Defense and transmitted by the Secretary of State
to all nations maintaining sea or air transport services or both.
The Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate measures to interdict prohibited material and equipment, employing the land, sea and
air forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces made
available by members of the United Nations.
The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations and issue
such directives as he deems necessary to ensure the effectiveness of
this order, including the designation of special restricted zones and
routes £or su~face, subsurface or air transit within the zone herein
indicated.
Any vessel, surface or subsurface, or aircraft within the zone
herein indicated, as further defined by the Secretary of Defense, may
be intercepted, required to identify itself and disclose its cargo,
equipment, stores and ports of call and may also be required to stop,
lie to, surface, land and submit to visit and search. Vessels or aircraft may be diverted for visit and search to such reasonable places
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at which an effective health quarantine can be established as may be
designated by the Secretary of Defense.
In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except for selfdefense and to require compliance with my directions herein or with
the regulations or directives of the Secretary of Defense issued hereunder after reasonable efforts, have been made to communicate them
to the vessel or aircraft. Force shall be used in any case only to the
extent necessary.
The United States, Scythia, Antioka and Nueva are members of
the United Nations and the World Health Organization. The United
States, Nueva and Antioka are also members of the Organization
of American States, parties to the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance and to other general treaties and agreements
forming the Inter-American System, including the Pan American
Sanitary Code of 1924 and the Pan American Health Organization.
You are examining the draft proclamation with a view to suggesting changes to insure its effective execution by naval forces.
As part of this examination you are considering the legality of action
by naval forces in international law pursuant to the proclamation
and regulations and directives of the Secretary likely to be issued
thereunder. Do you think the draft proclamation requires revision?
I£ revision is required, what revisions would you suggest and why?
Discussion: Situation 6

1. Law and Biological Warfare: Tentative Analysis of Facts
Although the United States, the Soviet Union and other major
powers are equipped to wage biological warfare, and states with
modest physical resources can marshal a host of germs and germ
carriers to be used :for military purposes, the legal problems attending future widespread uses of biological weapons are conjectural.
No great attention until the past decade has been given to the law
of bioligical warfare. 76 This has been due in part to a tendency to
confuse biological with chemical weapons.
These devices have different physical characteristics, techniques
of employment and incidence of general risk. It has been tacitly
assumed that legal problems arising from the use o:f chemical
we a pons will arise from the use of biological weapons as well.
Effective military biological weapons also are recent innovations.
Past uses of biological weapons have been sporadic, usually by
imaginative and resourceful local commanders, who could perceive
advantages provided by nature, such as smallpox or plague victims
76 See Neinast, "United States Use of Biological Warfare" 24 Mil. L. Rev., 1,
9 (1964) (DA Pam 27-100-24, 1 April1964).
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to be directed into the camp o£ a susceptible enemy. Opportunities
£or advance planning to employ biological weapons against an
attacker or defender \Vere slight, although these opportunities are
now provided by development o£ militarily effective mutations o£
biological pathogens. Furthermore, so great were the problems o£ a
commander \vith disease in his O\Vn ranks, that before development
o£ effective immunization techniques and antibiotics, the "blow-back"
hazard in biological \veapons made their general employment
awkward.
It has also been difficult in the past, although it is becoming less
difficult in the light o£ modern warfare conventions, to draw sharp
moral or ethical distinctions bet\veen situations in which a :force
a waits debilitation o£ its enemy by epidemic or endemic diseases
before assault; in which the force accentuates the physical problems
o£ its enemy by compounding the \Vork o£ epidemic or endemic
diseases by denying medical personnel, supplies or equipment or
by refusing to exchange prisoners or permit civilians in enemy
territory to emigrate; and in which the force deliberately infects
enemy personnel with debilitating or fatal diseases.
Nineteenth and early 20th century lawmakers and their advisers
were unable to make to their satisfaction, in an era prior to the
staging o£ total wars and the mechanical socialization o£ military
risk, moral or. ethical distinctions between these transactions. This
inability weighed against any intensive consideration o£ biological
warfare in the early arms conferences.
Only two international conventions dealing with techniques o£
warfare contain provisions related or reasonably applicable to biological warfare. The Geneva Gas Protocol o£ 1925 prohibits the "use
o£ bacteriological methods o£ warfare." 77 Article 23 (a) of the
Regulations annexed to Hague Convention No. IV forbids the use
o£ poisons or poisoned weapons and perhaps can be construed to
extend to biological toxins. 78
There has been no integration o£ these provisions £or administration and enforcement into the international health regime, The international health regime is based upon a series o£ sanitary conventions.79 The earliest of these was in 1851. The policies expressed
in these conventions, keyed to modern medical knowledge and techniques, adjusted to contemporary world political organization, and
applied to existing means o£ transport and communication, now
7794 L.N.T.S. 65,69 (1929).

Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1908, 180.
A summary of the Sanitary Conventions from 1851 through 1951 may be
found in Goodman, Internatiooal Health Organizations, 49-79 (1952).
78

79
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appear in the Charter of the World Health Organization 80 and the
Sanitary Regulations which this Organization issues. 81 Regional
health organizations operate under the general aegis of the world
body.
There are no international legal restraints upon the development
of biological munitions except to the extent that testing of the
munitions is limited. Tests upon unwilling human subjects may be
precluded by international law and limitations may exist upon the
preemption or indefinite contamination of certain testing areas.
Restrictions upon biological weapons in conventional warfare are
uncertain and there is even greater ambiguity when these weapons
are considered for use in various forms of unconventional warfare.
Frequent condemnations of alleged biological warfare, when these
condemnations are for the purpose of propaganda or to obscure
preparations for biological warfare, meet no current legal impediment. 82
Threatening an attack with biological weapons and clandestine
deployment of these weapons to provide a coercive edge to diplomatic
action may be reasonably expected to elicit a violent response from
the threatened opponent. An attack with biological weapons may
be difficult to detect until much time after the attack has been
delivered. This time lag may range from a few hours to several
weeks.
There also _m ay be no passive defensive measures against some biological munitions. Such munitions might be mutants of biological
pathogens little known in the country attacked or threatened. 83
(1946-41), 793.
81 For the current WHO Regulations No. 2 see 37 Official Records of theWorld Health Organization, 335 (1952). The International Sanitary Regulations
are prepared and placed in force by an unusual treaty process. Draft regulations are prepared by an appropriate body of the World Health Organization
and laid before the Health Assembly for discussion and adoption. Upon adoption, the Regulations are notified by the Director General to Governments and
after the expiration of a time fixed in the notice are binding upon a member
state which does not notify its rejection of them. See Constitution, World
Health Organization, Articles 21, 22, Yearbook of the United Nations (1946-47),
796.
82 Aspects of the exchanges between the United States, the Soviet Union and
Red China based upon biological warfare charges by the latter may be found
in 26, 27 and 28 Department of State Bulletin (1951, 1952, 1953) passim and
Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, 194-201 (1961).
83 "If the agents adaptable to biological warfare were limited to those that
cause known diseases, the problems of defense would be less complex. But we
know that there is a possibility that an enemy could develop mutant types of
diseases for which there would be no known defenses. * * *" Stubbs, The
so Yearbook ot the United Nations
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The only defense in this case is an attack upon sources of supply
of the munition and upon delivery agencies.
The National Security Council has chosen to rely upon diplomacy
to eliminate the threat of biological attack confronting the United
States. But the risk of failure of diplomatic processes is unacceptable in this case. The Nuevan-Scythian Concert must be given
no opportunity to deliver their biological munitions while negotiations are under way. United States forces must be placed in a
position from which the threat can be quickly eliminated if negotiations fail.
The Situation has features in common with the Cuban Quarantine
of 1962. Naval operations are to be conducted upon the high seas
and in superjacent airspace. Air reconnaissance may be conducted
over Nuevan territory. The naval action contemplated is of an
economic nature. The flow of certain military supplies is to be
interrupted without stimulating major coercive exchanges which
might bring into operation the various treaties and customs incident
to belligerency.
There are also major distinctions. The danger of immediate attack
is probably greater than in the Quarantine of· 1962. Biological
weapons are maneuvered actively to apply pressure upon the
United States. These weapons can be employed at sea for maximum
flexibility and can be delivered without likelihood of immediate
detection.
The Organization of American States appears unwilling to support the action of the United States. Once action by the United
States commences, Scythian disengagement, unlike Soviet disengagement in the Quarantine of 1962, will be difficult because shipments
out of Nueva of the prohibited materials and equipment also will be
interdicted.
The features in common with the Quarantine of 1962 mean that
many of the legal problems present there will be involved also in
the situation presently considered. Accordingly, legal aspects of
naval participation in the Quarantine will first be examined. Its
lessons will then be applied to the threat of biological warfare by
Scythia and ~ueva.

2. Analysis of the Quarantine in Four Phases
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a distinguished lawyer,
public servant and counsellor to the President i.n the Crisis of
October 1962, has remarked that survival of a state is not a matter
Oritioal Importance of OBR in National Defense (Robert A. Welch Foundation

Research Bulletin No. 9, 1961), 11.
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of law and the propriety of the Cuban Quarantine is not a legal
issue. 84 Mr. Acheson does not suggest that law was irrelevant to
the decision to quarantine but ascribed greater importance in such
a decision to judgments by the President and his advisers concerning
the timing of action and the generation of power to force a desired
response from an opponent.
Few persons consider the Executive Committee advising the
President in October 1962, deduced its advice from international law,
could have done this if it had tried, or confined its survey of alternatives to courses of action which international law clearly permitted.
No rational decision maker is likely to analyze a problem in this
way.
The decision maker should forecast the likelihood of volitional
acceptance, both of the end sought and the means considered, by
persons whose values are affected significantly by the action proposed. There should be a preference for repetitive action, when
surprise of the opponent is not critical, to secure coordination of the
response in situations in which a response amenable to coordination
might reasonably be predicted. Adequate machinery and standards
for guiding subordinates in executing the decision should be provided.
But despite the accuracy of Mr. Acheson's observation when
related to the high level of decision he was considering, as problems
were defined or particularized on lower levels of decision as the
Quarantine was planned and executed, law-in its conventional
sense-became increasingly relevant. As concrete cases were presented, law was needed to coordinate action, persuade opponents and
allies and guide subordinates.
Many decisions were involved in the Quarantine, each in a slightly
different context, and each of which could raise distinct legal
Issues.
Rational judgments applying law to the Quarantine require consideration of the basic decision by the President with the many
other decisions by the President and other officials and private
persons involved in the conflict. These include the Presiden.t's decision to coordinate action by the United States with the mediating
efforts of the Secretary General, the President's decision to terminate
the Quarantine, the decisions of his executive officers and the decisions of officers of international organizations and other states
drawn into the conflict.
The dimensions of conflict in the Quarantine changed as new
demands by new participants were asserted. The shape of interB4

(1963) Proo. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 13, 14.
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action among the participants varied from a high degree of intensity
of coercion in the beginning to a high intensity of persuasion in the
end. As new advisors to new decision makers joined the contest,
differing concepts of the function of law and the requirements of a
legal order 'vere injected into the policy exchanges.
To develop a perspective of the mesh of decisions involved in the
Quarantine, it is convenient to consider the Quarantine as having
developed in four phases. The phase lines selected are laid at points
at which key or critical policies were exposed by their maker. "Exposure" of a policy means that the policy maker has temporarily
crystallized his position vis-a-vis his own subordinates or superiors
or with respect to the target of his policy.
The policy maker exposes his policy when he reaches either a
point of "no return~' or a p9int at which a return to the status quo
ante would be so a'vkward that serious consideration of this return
is precluded. Execution of the- policy need not necessarily have
commenced for these situations to arise.
a. OUBAN QUARANTINE: PHASE 1
The first phase of the Quarantine began with the President's
receipt of information concerning the presence of offensive weapons
with crews in Cuba. The phase ended with delivery of the President's
proposed public address on the crisis to Ambassador Dobrynin at
about 6:00 P.M., E.S.T., 22 October 1962. This phase covers the
secret planning of the Quarantine.
The most detailed accounts of the conferences of the President's
"Executive Committee" have been offered by Mr Sorensen, Special
Counsel to the President and by Mr. Abel. 85 However, it is probable
that the details of the conferences have been incompletely disclosed
and are likely to remain so until security restrictions are lifted and
the recollections of additional participants and their staffs can be
probed. Any current analysis of the role of law in this decisionmaking process must necessarily be provisional.
All commentators dealing with this first phase of the Quarantine
recognize the planning as unilateral by the United States. Allies
of the United States were informed of the decision before the
85 Sorensen, Kennedy, 674-718 (1965); Abel, The Missile Crisis (1966). For
similar detail see Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 801-819 (1965). All accounts
suggest legal considerations were involved in formulating the "quarantine"
policy but figured in a subordinate role. Accounts, which are less detailed and
no doubt less accurate since the writers lacked first-hand knowledge of the
proceedings, may be found in the controversial article by Alsop and Bartlett,
"In Time of Crisis," Saturday Evening Post, 8 December 1962, 15 and in Daniel
and Hubbell, Strike in the West (1963).
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announcement to the American public. They were not, however,
consulted in its formulation.
It is unlikely the legal foundations o£ any demands these allies
might make were considered in any detail by the Executive Committee advising the President. Treaty obligations of the United
States and international legal doctrine bearing upon "intervention"
do appear to have been considered.
The presence of Ambassador Stevenson as a member of the Executive Committee and reports of his extensive participation suggest
careful attention to the alternatives open to the United States as a
member of the United Nations. Treaties of the Inter-American
system appear to have been discussed and weighed. Rapid action
by the United States in bringing its case before the United Nations
and the Organization of American States suggests responsibilities
of membership in these organizations were carefully assessed.
The selection of naval force as the major policy instrument indicates consideration and appreciation of the legal features of the
impending conflict. Naval units-surface, subsurface and aircan apply a broad range of coercive and persuasive policies. Naval
force is the flexible armed instrument for national action.
The Quarantine may have been among the least coercive of the
alternatives open to the United States in the October crisis. But
naval forces, in executing the Quarantine, could also apply maximum coercion to destroy the missiles and their sites if this proved
necessary.
Furthermore, the operations of surface craft in situations such as
those developed in the Quarantine have long been familiar. The
"pacific blockades" discussed by publicists in the late 19th and early
20th centuries may not have hurdled a generation of controversy
to become settled international legal custom. But as minimum exercises of coercion in situations in which maximum exercises of
coercion might reasonably have been expected, pacific blockades
have had virtues as convenient short circuits for applications of
coercive power.
Moreover, by adopting a pattern of naval action similar to pacific
blockade, United States policy makers 'vere working at the threshold
of law-where the coordinating features of law were present
although the persuasive features of unresisted repeated practice were
lacking. The examples of pacific blockade "\vere few and records of
voluntary agreement to their use even fewer.
Pacific blockade records, few a.s they were, provided a basis for
Soviet predictions concerning the probable direction of development
of American action. The Soviets could read between the lines of
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the various executive st atements concerning Quarantine operations.
A standard was provided for estimating the degree of violence
which United States naval forces were likely to apply.
In war a policy hewing to this predictable pattern might spell
disaster for the United States. In the Quarantine, communications
were improved and the chances of accomplishing the obj ects of
United States policies were enhanced.
The coordinating element of law was present in adoption by t he
United States of a "pacific contraband" pattern for action-a minor
variant of the '~pacific blockade." The United States did not rely
on "pacific blockade" doctrine to persuade its allies or opponents. Nor
would the Soviets have admitted the "legality" of naval interference
with their shipping.
Pacific Blockade
Pacific blockade is founded upon the sharp war-peace dichotomy
characterizing 19th century legal thought._ A few instances of
pacific blockade, such as the French blockades of Formosa in 18841885 86 and of Siam in 1893,87 are described as "pacific" principally
because the blockaded state could offer no resistance. In other cases,
such as the Chilean blockade of Bolivia in 1879,88 the conflict was a
war in the nineteenth century legal sense, but was too limited to
stimulate declarations of neutrality by nonparticipants. Still other
cases involve uses of naval power to collect debts from recalcitrant
debtors. The pacific blockades of Portugal ( 1831) ; 89 Carthagena
(1834); 90 Mexico (1838); 91 and San Salvador (1842) 92 by France;
New Granada (1837); 93 Nicaragua (1842 and 1844); 94 Greece
(1850); 95 and Brazil (1862-1863) 96 by Great Britain; and the
joint blockade of Venezuela by British, German and Italian units
in 1902-1903; 97 fall within this category. Today these actions clearly
would be inconsistent with treaty obligations of the blockaders.
Several pacific blockade cases involved peace maintenance efforts
in joint operation by naval powers. These cases occurred before the
See Hogan, Pacific Blockade, 122 (1908).
Ibid., 137.
88 Ibid., 120.
89 Ibid., 77.
oo Ibid., 82.
91 Ibid., 85.
92 Ibid., 91.
93 Ibid., 83.
94 Ibid., 92, 95.
95 Ibid., 105.
96 Ibid., 117.
9 7 Ibid., 149.
86

87
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development of multinational security organizations, such as the
League of Nations and the United Nations.
Thus Great Britain, Russia and France agreed in 1827 to act
together to restore peace in Greece. The powers established a blockade of the Morea to prevent egress of the Turkish fleet from
N avarino; and, without a rupture of diplomatic relations with the
Porte, ultimately destroyed the Turkish fleet in a major naval
action. 98
Anglo-French naval forces blockaded the Netherlands in 1832-1833
to require the latter to execute the treaty of 1831 for the independence
of Belgium.99 French naval units blockaded Uruguay to cut off
supplies from Argentina to the Oribe forces; 100 and this blockade
was revived in 1845-1850 by Anglo-French vessels.101
The blockades directed by Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy
and Russia against Greece in 1886; 102 and by the same powers with
the addition of France against the Greeks in Crete in 1897; 103 have
been regarded by most commentators as actions taken with a
principal motive to reduce disorder and facilitate negotiations to
restore peace.
When peace enforcement or restoration of peace has been the
principal object of naval action, the form of interference with
shipping has been analogous to a wartime imposition of contraband
controls rather than to a "close" blockade as understood prior to
World War I. In the Greek blockade of 1827, the blockading force
appears to have denied only weapons and reinforcements to the
Turkish army. 104 The blockade of Crete in 1897, while applying to
all Greek vessels, was applied on]y to supplies destined for Greek
insurgents when carried on vessels of other states. 105 The French
blockade of Uruguay in 1838-1840 seemed intended to deny arms
and troops to Oribe, although the joint Ap.glo-French blockade of
1845-1850 seems to have extended to all dutiable merchandise.106
There has been no express formulation by writers on the subject
or in the judgments of courts of a theory of "pacific contraband"
Ibid., 73.
Ibid., 80.
1oo Ibid., 88.
1o1 Ibid., 98.
1o2 Ibid., 126.
103 Ibid., 142.
104 Ibid., 74, 75.
105 Ibid., 144, 49.
100 Ibid., 89. Note, however, the official notice to the British Foreign Office
98
99

seemed to extend to "any merchandise subject to custom house duties" as was
in fact the ambit of the later Anglo-French blockade of 1840-1850. Ibid., 161.
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as distinguished from "pacific blockade." In L e Oom te de Thomar, 101
decided by the French Prize Court, a B razilian merchantman which
had received no notice of the French blockade of Uruguay was
seized while carrying powder and lead to the Oribe forces. Under
the French prize practice, the vessel could not be condemned :for
breach of blockade because it had no notice.
It was then sought to condemn its cargo as contraband. This the
court held could not be done because there could be contraband
only in time of war and only a belligerent could seize it.
Yet, despite Le Oomte de Thom,a r, the pacific contraband aspect
of pacific blockade, described by some writers as a "selective blockade"; and a non wartime practice related to unneutral service, which
might be described as "unlawful destination, detention or service";
when divorced from the rubric of pacific blockade and the obsolete
practice by which debts are collected through the use of naval
power, may suggest the nature of future nonbelligerent applications
of naval force involving minimum violence.
The British and German pacific blockade of Zanzibar in 18881889, to interrupt the trade in arms is a typical early example of
application of pacific contraband rules; or to the extent directed
to interruption of the traffic in slaves, as application of doctrine
concerning "unlawful destination, detention, or service." 108
Nationalist Chinese naval operations, conducted upon ·a theory
of closure of the mainland ports, might be better received by the
major maritime nations if conducted under clear-cut "pacific"
contraband lists. 109
During the period of illegal entries into Palestine, preceding
termination of the British Mandate, British operations against
ships on the high seas carrying illegal immigrants might be supported by an ·analogy to unneutral service in time of war. 110 A state
normally is expected to apply its immigrant controls within its
territorial waters. But this narrow ambit for action presupposes
stable political conditions within the state which seeks to control
immigration and controls applied at points of sea or air embarkation.
Pistoye & Duverdy, 1 Traite des Prises Maritin~es, 390 (1855). See Hogan,
Pacific Blockade, 104 ( 1908).
108 Hogan, Paci fie Blockade, 130 ( 1908).
107

For a discussion of the theory of port closure see Woolsey, "Closure of
Ports of the Chinese Nationalist Government," 44 A.J.I.L., 350 (1950).
11° For a discussion of British activity see Naim Molvan v. Attorney General
(1948) A.C. 351 (P.C. 1948). Over forty vessels were visited and searched. Most
of these ultimately were seized, although in most instances the seizures took
place within Palestinian territorial waters.
109
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British visit and search of vessels upon the high seas suspected of
carrying illegal immigrants; escort of vessels found to be carrying
illegal immigrants within Palestinian territorial waters; and seizure
of the vessels there with an orderly disembarkation and temporary
detention of their passengers seemed acceptable to most of the
maritime nations.
Practices of "pacific contraband" and "unlawful detention, destination or service," for which no general acceptance by states can
presently be claimed, merge into the relatively well settled practices
by which a state enforces its revenue and quarantine laws against
vessels "hovering" off its coast or its trade restrictions imposed upon
persons within its territorial waters. A hovering theory will support
French naval action to intercept arms shipments to Algeria. "Selfdefense," as in the "Quarantine," also is a strong argument.
Dutch naval operations in the Indonesian area prior to Indonesian
independence appear to have been almost, if not entirely, within
Indonesian territorial waters and aimed at smuggling, the arms
trade, and shipments of nationalized property. 111 The Egyptian
naval action against shipping to Israel commenced as a blockade
jure belli confined, however, largely to interdiction in the Suez Canal
and its approaches. 112
While there is not general acquiescence in any of these practices
by the states affected, upon which a positivistic claim of law developed by consent can be founded, it has become almost routine to
tolerate naval interferences with shipping in areas in which tensions
ar~ great, as in the Formosa Straits or Caribbean, with little more
than token protests. Policy makers of states have been conditioned
to accept naval interference with shipping without a routine violent
response although protests may be filed. The response is much the
same as that of the usual private citizen to police officers serving
his community.
This general attitude seems based upon four factors: (1) The
close control maintained by a state over its naval forces and the high
degree of discipline of officers and men which the efficient conduct of
naval affairs requires; (2) The usual familiarity of naval officers
with international law pertaining to their duties; (3) The lack of
an adequate system of international police upon the high seas;
See S.S. Martin Behrman, 16 Department of State Bulletin, 720 (1947).
A summary of decisions of the Egyptian Prize Court may be found in
44 A.J.I.L., 774 (1950). Continuation of the Egyptian action since the Armistice,
which has been described by several writers as a form of pacific blockade, is
considered in detail in Gross, "Passage Through the Suez Canal of Israel Bound
Cargo and Israel Ships," 51 A.J.I.L., 530 (1957).
111

112
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( 4) The range of persuasion and coercion of which a naval force
is capable.
The choice of the naval service as the major executive agency in
the Quarantine suggests the Executive Committee weighed the
flexibility in law and po·wer of this service in its recommendation
to the President. While the Navy was a logical and efficient choice
to interdict sea carriage of ballistic missiles, their supporting equipment and unassembled aircraft, interdiction by sea action was by
no means the quickest method to exclude the offensive arms from
Cuban soil.
A violent response to seizures of Cuban ports of destination or
launching sites for the missiles by airborne units or to destruction
of these by ultradecisive weapons might reasonably be predicted.
Policy makers are conditioned to accept without violent responsive
action the accustomed and easily controlled types of intervention.
The "justification" for prompt action by the United States to
interfere with installation of the Soviet missiles and their supporting equipment and the importation into Cuba and assembly there
of jet bombers was considerable. As summarized in the President's
public address of 22 October 1962 113 and as derived from other
public sources, these facts were before the Executive Committee:
(1) Medium range ballistic missiles with an effective nuclear
armed range of 1,000 nautical miles were installed in Cuba and
operational. Sites for intermediate range ballistic missiles were under
construction.
(2) Jet bombers capable of transporting and delivering nuclear
weapons were in Cuba and being assembled. Bases for them were
in preparation.
( 3) Soviet crews to man these weapons systems were in Cuba.
(4) Additional missiles, fuel, supporting equipment, planes and
crews were in transit by sea to Cuba.
( 5) In the usual military sense, undistorted for deception or
propaganda, the missiles and aircraft in Cuba sent by the Soviet
Union were designed principally as "initiative" or "offensive"
weapons. The President had made clear to Soviet representatives
that weapons of this type were regarded as "offensive weapons" by
the United States.
(6) Missiles fired from Cuba against targets in the United States
would bypass the long-range warning system. The reaction time
which this long-range warning system could provide would be
eliminated. This reduced the deterrent effect of United States missiles
and aircraft. Furthermore, bringing all parts of the United States
ua N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1962, p. 18, col. 2.
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within range of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range
missiles eliminated the advantage of the United States in effective
intercontinental (long-range) ballistic missiles. The power equilibrium between the free and closed worlds was significantly upset.
(7) Shipment and installation of the Soviet weapons systems were
rapid and clandestine. Public and private assurances of representatives of the Soviet Union were violated. These features suggested
Soviet intentions of ( 1) surprise attack or ( 2) surprise diplomatic
action. Although failure to camouflage the bases with care suggests
surprise diplomatic action as the immediate Soviet intention, surprise attack could not be excluded in view of the tension between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
While the existence of "justification" for action does not mean that
the action was necessarily "legaF' or necessarily "illegal," features
other than subjective judgments by an actor being relevant in community judgments within a legal order, the continuing effort to
find facts before the decision to Quarantine was made and as the
Quarantine was executed, coupled with the element of "necessity"
for action which these facts disclosed, do bear upon community
judgments of legality.
During the deliberations of the Executive Committee and thereafter during conduct of the Quarantine, except for a short time
during the visit of Acting Secretary General U Thant to Cuba,
intensive efforts to assemble facts were made by air reconnaissance
and other means. Although no decision maker constitutionally
responsible for the security of his state against foreign armed attack
is expected to exhaust the fact-finding resources at his disposalin the sense that a court or legislative committee might be expected
to delay decisions pending availability of important witnesses or
documents-diligence in seeking facts before his decision and during
execution of his policy is an element of the legal standard of "reasonableness" by which his action may be measured.
Naval force was used to stabilize Soviet power in Cuba at its
pre-Quarantine level pending a clarification of Soviet objectives.
The impact of naval action in producing a disclosure of Soviet
intentions, an important part of the fact-finding process, was as
important as the impact of naval action in preserving the status quo.
Stability and information were joined to permit the working of
persuasive processes.
The intense effort to acquire facts upon which a sound decision
might be based; the apparent care and reflection by the Executive
Committee in formulating the advice considered by the President;
the President's decision to use minimum coercion; his selection of
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naval force as the coercive instrument; the limitations placed upon
employment of the naval force-both in the Proclamation and in
directives of the Secretary of Defense; and the immediate recourse
both to the Organization of American States and the United Nations;
all suggest the decisive role played by domestic and international
law in channeling the President's decision. A more effective working of law in the development of human affairs is difficult to conceive-and the case for legality of the first phase of the Quarantine
was established before any Quarantining vessel was on station. 114
b. CUBAN QUARANTINE: PHASE f2

The second phase of the Quarantine extends from deli very
of the Dobrynin letter on 22 October until publication of the Soviet
order to its vessels transporting prohibited weapons, equipment or
supplies to avoid the area of American naval interdiction. This order
was issued at an undisclosed time on the morning of 24 October.
The President's Quarantine Proclamation had become effective at
10 :00 A.M., E.S.T., on that date.
The period of unconcerted confrontation of the Soviet Union by
the United States was limited to this second phase. The only contact, however, between the Soviet units and the quarantining force
was audiovisual. This contact included sonar tracking of submarines
and air reconnaissance of Soviet shipping by Navy and Air Force
units.
Overwhelming force was coupled with concomitant recourse by
the United States to processes for negotiation. The case of the
United States was placed promptly before the Security Council
of the United Nations. 115 The United States obtained the support
114 An impressive array of legal skills were available to the President in his
Executive Committee--the Attorney General, Ambassador Stevenson, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Ball performing advisory functions.
Professor Mallison lists the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Deputy
Judge Advocate General, the Assistant Navy Judge Advocate General for
Administrative and International Law and the Director of the Navy International Law Division as having worked on the President's Proclamation.
Civilian consultants included the Deputy Attorney General, the Legal Adviser
of the Department of State, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense,
and Mr. Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. See Mallison, "Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law," 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.,
335, 336 n. 196 ( 1962).
A detailed identification of Executive Committee members appears in Sorensen, Kennedy, 674-675 (1965).
115 For the text of Ambassador Stevenson's letter to President Zorin of the
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of the Organization of American States, formalized in the Resolution of the Provisional Organ of Consultation. 116 Correspondence
was exchanged between the President and Chairman Khrushchev. 117
As the phase ended, the conciliatory tone of the Khrushchev letter
to Lord Russell signalled Soviet recognition of a margin of United
States naval supremacy in the Caribbean which precluded rational
challenge. 118
Security Council and the text of the appended draft resolution, see 47 Department of State Bulletin, 724 ( 1962).
The draft resolution called for immediate dismantling and withdrawal from
Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons, for the dispatch to Cuba of
a United Nations observer corps to see that this was done, and for termination
of the Quarantine upon United Nations certification of compliance with the
order to dismantle and withdraw the missiles and other offensive weapons.
Paragraph 4 of the draft resolution urged the United States and the Soviet
Union to confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the
security of the Western Hemisphere and report thereon to the Security Council.
The text of Ambassador Stevenson's statement to the Security Council on
October 23, 1962, appears at 47 Department of State Bulletin, 723 (1962).
116 See 47 Department of State Bulletin, 722 (1962). After a preamble, the
Council resolves: (1) To call for the immediate dismanting and withdrawal
from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability;
(2) To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and
8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures,
individually and collectively, including the use of armed forces which they may
deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to
receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies
which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the
missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat
to the peace and security of the Continent; (3) To inform the Security Council
of the United Nations of this Resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the
Charter of the United Nations and to express the hope that the Security
Council will, in accordance with the draft Resolution introduced by the United
States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment;
( 4) To continue to serve provisionally as Organ of Consultation and to
request the member states to keep the Organ of Consultation duly informed of
measures taken by them in accordance with paragraph two of this Resolution.
The Resolution was approved unanimously by the Council. As the Resolution
suggests, the case of the United States was before the Security Council before
the Resolution was passed. The President's Proclamation of Quarantine was
delayed until the Council of the Organization of American States had acted.
The Proclamation of Quarantine appears at 27 Federal Register 10401 (No.
3504) and also at 47 Department of State Bulletin, 717 (1962).
117 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1962, p. 22, col. 2. The text of this letter has never
been published. The secret letter paraphrased in Abel, The Missile Crisis, 178181 (1966) appears to be of a later date. Delivered to the President apparently
on October 24, it was said "to be in the same inconclusive vein as the Kremlin's
public statements thus far."
us See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1962, p. 22, col. 2. The letter was published five
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Although the problem remained to secure the removal of missiles
and other offensive weapons from Cuba, an increase of the threat to
the United States by the introduction of additional missiles or aircraft was blocked by the mere display of naval force. Once determination to use this force was demonstrated, the United States and
the Soviet Union resolved on a settlement of the issues by negotiation
rather than by violence.
c. OUBAN QUARANTINE: PHASE 3

During the third phase of the Quarantine, extending from
publication of the diversion order by the Soviet Union to its transports to publication of the Khrushchev letter of 28 October,119
announcing his order for dismantling and return to the Soviet Union
of missiles, offensive aircraft and their supporting equipment in
Cuba, Acting Secretary General U Thant became active in attempting to resolve the conflict. Seeking a voluntary suspension of both
arms shipments from the Soviet Union and the Quarantine by the
United States, the Acting Secretary General secured an informal
understanding on 26 October, stated in the words of the President :120
* * * /I/ f the Soviet Union accepts and abides by your request
'that the Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba stay away
from the interception area' for the limited time required for
preliminary discussion, you may be assured that this Government will accept and abide by your request that our vessels in
the Caribbean 'do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to
minimize the risk of an untoward incident'* * *
Chairman Khrushchev, having diverted Soviet vessels because he
was powerless to prevent their seizure and could not hazard capture
of their secret tackle and cargo, replied to the Acting Secretary
General : 121
* * * /W/ e therefore accept your proposal, and have ordered
the masters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba but not yet within
the area of the American warships' piratical activities to stay
out of the interception area as you recommend.
Any substantial chance of a violent encounter between United
hours after the Quarantine went into effect. While Daniel and Hubbell state
that the State Department decided to.• ignore this maneuver because Lord
Russell was "so discredited a figure," the letter suggested summit talks and was
the first public suggestion that the Soviet Union would not attempt to break
the Quarantine. See Daniel and Hubbell, Strike in the West, 139 (1963).
119 See 47 Departmer~,t of State BuUetin, 743 (1962).
12o N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1962, p. 8; col. 4.
121 N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1962, p. 8, col. 2.
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States naval forces and Soviet surface craft was thus eliminated.
A watch was maintained by United States naval units, a few
Soviet trawlers were shadowed and Soviet and unidentified submarines were harassed. 122
Prior to this informal agreement secured by the Acting Secretary
General, United States naval personnel from two ships boarded and
searched M arucla, a Soviet chartered Lebanese merchantman, about
180 miles northwest of Nassau. The master cooperated in the visit
and search. No prohibited items were found. 123 Two Soviet tankers,
Vinnitiza and Bucharest, and an East German passenger ship,
Voelkerfreund, traversed the interception area without being
boarded. The master of Bucharest and the captain of the intercepting destroyer exchanged messages. 124 V innitiza and Voelkerfreund appear to have been hailed, but no further details of the
encounters are repor_ted. 125
The disturbance of sea commerce of states other than the Soviet
Union during the third phase of the Quarantine was at a minimum.
Special warnings that reactions to the Quarantine might render
hazardous transit of the Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits and
Wind ward Passage, were broadcast at regular intervals by the
Navy. A "Clearcert" system, similar to the British Navicert system
of World War II, was announced on 27 October. 126 Many of the
certificates were issued.
A clearance certificate could be obtained from United States
customs authorities for a vessel departing without contraband from
a United States port-whether bound for Cuba or merely transiting
the interception zone. For vessels departing from foreign ports, a
Notice of Transit could be filed with the American consulate at the
last port of departure if the vessel was only to cross the interception
See Daniel and Hubbell, Strike in the West, 163 (1963).
Ibid., 166-67 for a detailed account; Sorensen, Kennedy, 710 (1965).
124 N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1962, p. 1, col. 2. The encounter occurred 22 hours
122

1.23

after the effective time of the Proclamation. The master appeared uncooperative,
but from an inspection without boarding, naval personnel decided only petroleum products were aboard.
12s Vinnitiza was the first Soviet vessel to pass the Quarantine and reach
Cuba. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1962, p. 6, col. 4. She may have cleared the interception area before the Quarantine was fully established. Bucharest and
Voelkerfreund were allowed to pass without boarding by Presidential order
that sufficient time be allowed for each ship to obtain Soviet instructions. See
Abel, The Missile Crisis, 158-159 (1966); Sorensen, Kennedy, 710 (1965).
126 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1962, p. 20, col. 6. These notices are reproduced
in Christol and Davis, "Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of
Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba, 1962," 57 A.J.I.L., 525,
544 (1963).
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zone. I£ bound for a Cuban port with no contraband, a clearance
certificate could be obtained from the American consulate.127
There was minor interference with shipping. The depressing
effect of the Quarantine upon trade in the Caribbean was noted
in the Greek merchant marine. 128 The Holland-American and
Swedish-American Lines rerouted their vessels to avoid the Windward Passage.l 29 British marine underwriters invoked the fourteen
day war risk clause in insurance contracts upon vessels engaging
in the Cuban trade and rates for the excluded area had to be
established by special agreement. 130 Air traffic into Cuba and across
the interception zone was reduced by Cuban security restrictions
on air transit and denial of landing privileges by many states to
the Soviet Union. 131 Although the Quarantine Proclamation applied
to aircraft, no effort appears to have been made by the United States
to use Quarantining units to intercept or divert them.
The coercive exchanges of the second phase of the Quarantine,
as a result of which no physical damage was inflicted, were reshaped by negotiation during the third phase into mutual postures
in which persuasive rather than coercive techniques were paramount.
This position was attained by reliance both by the United States
and the Soviet Union upon processes of mediation and negotiation
which the United States could provide, coupled with reasonable
cooperation by the President in a period of stress and anxiety with
the peacemaking efforts of the Acting Secretary General.
d. THE CUBAN QUARANTINE: PHASE

4

During the fourth phase of the Quarantine, which might be
described as a "peeping tom blockade," naval action by the United
States was concerted with action by the Soviets. Apart from the
continued harassment of submarines,I32 there were no coercive
features.
See 47 Department of State Bulletin, 747 (1962). The vessel could be
boarded and searched even if it possessed the clearance certificate or had filed
the notice of transit. This interference was unlikely and an expeditious clearance was possibl~.
128 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1962, p. 18, col. 3. Two hundred Greek vessels
were said to be laid up with about 100 more affected in their use by restrictions on the Cuban trade.
129 N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1962, p. 21, col. 2.
130 N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1962, p. 21, col. 4. United States insurers had ceased
coverage with the embargo upon American shipments to Cuba.
1 31 N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1962, p. 22, col. 4; Oct. 27, 1962, p. 7, col. 6.
1 3 2 Submarines were warned to surface by underwater explosion of four or
five harmless charges accompanied by the international code signal "I.D.K.C.A.,"
121
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Eight Soviet vessels outward bound from Cuba were visually
inspected without boarding. The visual inspections were conducted
from ships alongside the Soviet transports and from helicopters.
Masters of the Soviet vessels were cooperative in almost every
instance. Some of them ordered removal of the covers of crates on
deck. The vessels transported a total of forty-two crates which
appeared to contain missiles and deck cargo which appeared to be
missile launching equipment.
The Quarantine was suspended for two days ( 30 and 31 October)
while the Acting Secretary General was in Cuba. The Quarantine
was terminated on 21 November 1962 after the President was assured
by Chairman Khrushchev that Soviet jet bombers would be withdrawn within thirty days.1 3 3

3. Selected Legal Analyses of the Quarantine: Applications to
the Threat of Biological Attack

Writing shortly after termination of the Quarantine, Professor
Mallison of the George Washington Law School developed effective
self-defense and collective self-defense arguments supporting the
United States action. 134 Basing his analysis upon the framework
developed by Professor ~1cDougal and Dr. Feliciano,I35 Professor
Mallison examines the objectives of the claimants; the proportion of
the response by the United States to the initiating coercion of the
Soviet Union; and the reasonableness of the expectation of necessity
in the responding action.
He finds the Quarantine a form of coercion permitted under Articles 51 and 2 ( 4) of the United Nations Charter. The weight of a
collective judgment of necessity when action is pursuant to the
authority of the Organization of American States is stressed.
meaning "rise to the surface." Submarines were then to surface on an easterly
course.
Contact by United States naval forces with Soviet and unidentified submarines was said by Admiral George W. Anderson, U.S.N., Chief of Naval
Operations during the Quarantine, to have provided "perhaps the best opportunity since World War II" to perfect the skills of United States antisubmarine
warfare forces. See Christol and Davis, "Maritime Quarantine: The Naval
Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba, 1962." 57
A.J.I.L., 525, note 26 at 530 ( 1963).
133 N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1962, p. 10, col. 1; Pres. Proc. No. 3507, 27 Federal
Register 11525 ( 1962) .
tM Mallison, "Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: National
and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law," 31 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev., 335 (1962).
1as McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961).
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Summarizing his conclusions concerning legality o£ the Quarantine, Professor Mallison "\vrites: 136
* * '* /T/he limited coercion involved in the quarantineinterdiction was used in response to the initiating coercion o£ the
Soviet Union. This initiating coercion has been appraised £actually as posing a threat to the very survival o£ the United States.
* * * It has been appraised legally as inconsistent with the legal
obligations assumed by member states o£ the United Nations. In
this context, the formulation and implementation o£ the naval
quarantine-interdiction amount to the least possible use o£ the
military instrument. Any lesser use would have amounted to
abandonment o£ the military instrument and exclusive reliance
upon noncoercive procedures which would almost certainly have
been ineffective without supporting military power. The quarantine-interdiction* * *meets the requirements o£ reasonable necessity in its most stringent form. In the same way, the proportionality requirement in its most extreme form is met easily.
The conclusion of validity under international law follows. I£ it
did not, the consequence would be that the inherent right o£
national and collective self-defense, and its recognition as /a/
primary right in the United Nations Charter, would be destroyed.
The Mallison self-defense and collective self-defense position received support by Professors Fenwick/37 MacChesney 138 and
McDougal 139 in editorial comments written about six months after
termination o£ the Quarantine. The Mallison position tends to be
supported by other commentators even though the latter may offer
some other ground for validity of the United States action.
The official position o£ the Department o£ State concerning legality
o£ the Quarantine, offered to the press and set forth in detail in articles by Legal Adviser Chayes 140 and Deputy Legal Adviser
Meeker/ 41 pivots upon the Resolution o£ 23 October 1962 by the
Council o£ the Organization o£ American States. Acting provisionally
as an Organ o£ Consultation, the Council recommended individual
Mallison, supra, note 134 at 392.
Fenwick, "The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal or Illegal," 57 A.J.I.L.,
588 (1963).
138 MacChesney, "Some Comments on the 'Quarantine' of Cuba," 57 A.J.I.L.,
592 (1963).
1 29 McDougal, "The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense," 57 A.J.I.L.,
597 (1963).
140 See Chayes, "The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba," 47 Department of
State Bulletin, 763 (1962) ; "Law and the Quarantine of Cuba," 41 Foreign
Affairs, 550 (1963) ; and "Remarks," (1963) Proo. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 10.
141 Meeker, "Defensive Quarantine and the Law," 57 A.J.I.L., 515 (1963).
136

137
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and collective action by member states, includi-n g armed :force, which
these states deemed necessary to :
* * * ensure that the Govemment of Cuba cannot continue to
receive :from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security o:f the
Continent and prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability :from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and
security of the Continent. 142
The State Department law officers argue under Article 52 ( 1) of
the United Nations Charter/ 43 the Organization o:f American States,
while still subordinate to the World Organization, may use :force in
cases other than those involving armed attacks when this use is to
maintain peace and security in the Hemisphere. This action may be
taken without prior authorization by the Security Council.
The action is stated to be consistent with Article 2 ( 4) of the
United Nations Charter 144 as a measure adopted by a regional organization in conformity to the provisions o:f Chapter VIII. The purposes o:f the Organization of American States and its activities are
consistent with the purposes and principles o:f the United Nations
as required by Article 52 ( 1) .
Prior authorization by the Security Council is said by the State
Department officials to be unnecessary under Article 53 ( 1) because
the Organ of Consultation recommended rather than ordered a use
of :force. Language o:f the Charter, an advisory opinion of the World
Court, 145 and records of the practice o:f the Security Council are
See 47 Department of State Bulletin, 723 (1962).
Article 52 (1) provides: "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and
their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations."
144 Article 2 ( 4) provides : "All members shall refrain in their inte-rnational
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations."
1 4 5 Advisory Opinion of the International Oourt of Justice: Certain Expenses
of the United Nations j1962j I.O.J. Rep. 151. The most detailed statement of
the "prior authorization" point appears in Meeker, "Defensive Quarantine and
the Law," 57 A.J.I.L., 515 (1963), p. 520.
Article 53 (1) provides: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate,
utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under
its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. * * *" (Measures against an "enemy" state as defined in paragraph 2 of
the Article are excepted.)
142

1 43
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offered to support the proposition that enforcement action IS a
response to an order to act.
The spokesmen also argue prior authorization is not required by
Article 53(1) and subsequ,ent authorization is sufficient if an authorization of any sort is necessary. A subsequent authorization, they contend, was given impliedly by the Security Council when it considered
and did not forbid the proposed Quarantine before action was taken
by the Organization of American States.
Deputy Legal Adviser Meeker urges, as part of his case for the
United States, that extrahemispheric countries "such as the U.S.S.R.
are not in a position to attack the organization's activities within the
region" because the purposes and activities of the Organization are
in conformity with the relevant provisions of the United Nations
Charter. 146 He may suggest in this context that the Organization of
American States enjoys exclusive competence, subject of course to
intervention by the Security Council or recommendations by the
General Assembly, to recommend and guide applications of force by
its members within the geographical area defined by Article 4 of the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Pact) .147
With respect to Cuba, the State Department case is strong. Cuba,
however, was involved in the Quarantine principally as a potential,
although receptive, launching pad for Soviet missiles: and the State
Department arguments do not develop with clarity a theory to
support applications of force against Soviet vessels upon the high
seas.
Deputy Legal Adviser Meeker points to the anomaly which would
exist if the United States could destroy the missiles in Cuba by an
air strike or invasion but could not use less violent means upon the
high seas to interfere with the introduction of missiles into Cuba.
This anomaly would exist if the United States did have authority
for an air strike or invasion based upon the Council Resolution of
23 October.
It is by no means certain, however, that an application of :force of
this magnitude could be supported under the Resolution without a
more acute threat of attack upon the United States from the Cuban
bases. The Resolution of 23 October should be construed in the light
of changing circumstances and cannot reasonably be taken as carte
blanche for any degree of violent action however unnecessary and
imprudent such action might be. The legality of such action, fortunately, was never put to the test.
An argument is offered by Captain McDevitt, writing in the Navy
146
147

See Meeker, ibid., p. 518.
62 Stat. 1681 ( 1947) ; T I AS No. 1838.
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J.A.G. Journal, for an application o£ force to Soviet vessels based
upon a broad construction o£ the "local disputes" clause appearing in
Article 52(2) o£ the United Nations Charter. 148 Captain McDevitt
contends it may be reasonable to construe a "local dispute" as one
arising within the geographical area over which a regional agency
exercises authority even though states not members o£ the Organization are involved. This would bring the activities o£ the Soviet
Union in the region described in Article 4 o£ the Rio Pact within
reach o£ the regional agency.
He also argues that the Quarantine may be considered a measure
for "pacific" settlement o£ the dispute and not the "enforcement
action" described in Article 53(1) o£ the Charter. 149 Captain
McDevitt does not suggest a possible extension o£ the activities o£
the regional agency under Article 52 ( 2) beyond the geographical
area described in Article 4 o£ the Rio Pact.
It may be urged, ho,vever, that power in a regional security organization to resolve a dispute by pacific means should include competence to deal with active elements o£ the dispute in any area in
which the influence o£ its members can be applied. Permissive exercises o£ power (through recommendations and coordination) by the
Organization .o£ American States over nonmembers in areas beyond
those described in Article 4 o£ the Rio Pact may perhaps be sustained on the theory that the local origin o£ the dispute confers this
authority.
There is a suggestion in the writings o£ Legal Adviser Chayes
and Deputy Legal Adviser Meeker that this may be the direction o£
development o£ the analysis o£ the State Department in cases o£ this
type. Mr. Chayes, for example, refers to the role o£ regional security
agencies as increasingly important due to the creeping paralysis o:f
the Security Council brought on by the veto.
I£, as a matter o£ constitutional development in world security
organization, regional agencies will assume much the same function
in regional disputes as the General Assembly and Secretary General
have assumed in disputes o£ a global nature, it may be reasonable to
:148 McDevitt, "The U.N. Charter and the Cuban Quarantine," 72 JAG J., 71
(1963). Captain McDevitt also offers an argument based upon collective selfdefense. Article 52 (2) provides: "The Members of the United Nations entering
into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort
to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security
Council."
149 Captain McDevitt argues that under Security Council practice a measure
is not enforcement action when armed force is not used-and emphasizes the
presence of force without its use or direct application during the Quarantine.

289
view the reach of the regional organization in resolving local disputes by pacific processes as coextensive with that of the United
Nations. The proposition is administratively sound. Whether the
proposition will gain appreciable support is another matter, although
sooner or later legal-constitutional developments tend to follow the
path of administrative convenience.
Professor ChristoI and Commander Davis find in the experience of
the Quarantine the emergence of a "lusty new rule" providing an
"additional and unique option within the continuum of 'Force in
Peace'," allowing an "option of restrained coercion" which will avoid
the drastic procedures and consequences built around the concept of
" 'blockade' " and also "the strictures and uncertainties" of the pacific
blockade. 15D In addition to the self-defense formula, Christo! and
Davis offer an argument resting upon the affirmative duty of states
to maintain international peace. and security by acting collectively
as a regional security organization.
While not divorced from a theory of collective self-defense, the
Christol-Davis argument seems founded principally upon a duty to
"police" violent international power exchanges. This duty may be
institutionalized in Chapter I of the United Nations Charter. The
inquiry has current importance because of the egregious failures of
the Security Council as a peace enforcement institution.

4. Law and the Draft Proclamation: Permissible and
Impermissible Coercion

Professor McDougal and Dr. Feliciano, in their comprehensive
effort to give "aggression,'' "self-defense" and similar descriptions of
coercive levels and exchanges, meaning for decision makers, rely in
part upon the "just war" concept of the Spanish theologians. 151
They relate conceptions of permissible and im-permissible coercion to
a defined general community goal denying value reallocations by
intense coercion or violence. This relation is accomplished by the use
of detailed operational indices keyed to the current structure of
global and regional security organization.
Assuming the element of coercion in the transaction is unquestionable, which will ordinarily be the case when major armed
strength is deployed, the permissible-impermissible "coercion" spectrum affords a logical framework within which shifting facts can
be fixed, appraised and rationaRy related. This analytical structure
150

Christol and Davis, "Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of
Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba, 1962," 57 .A.J.I.L., 531
(1963).
151 McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 121-260
(1961).
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is adaptable at decision-making levels normally associated with the
execution of policies. At the same time, the system can be utilized
by high-level policy makers, although its importance at this level, as
suggested by Mr. Acheson,I 52 is to ensure a rational relation of observable facts and to induce insights into factual relationships.
Working within the general framework of contra posed initiating
coercion-self-defense contentions, McDougal and Feliciano describe
areas in which facts may be found and evaluated to inform a
decision maker. These areas include: (1) characteristics of the
participants; (2) their objectives~ including the range and importance of values sought ("consequentiality"), and the degree of
value sharing anticipated ("inclusiveness or exclusiveness"); (3)
"modalities"-which might range from the application of armed
violence to less co~rcive techniques-such as those associated with
economic warfare; ( 4) the effects secured-the effects produced
in the value and institutional structure of the State upon which the
questioned coercion has been exerted and the relation of the intensity
of the coercive act to the intensity pattern of coercive exchanges
between the states involved; ( 5) the degree to which community
procedures for resolution of the conflict have been utilized or resisted; and ( 6) the power which can be mobilized to sustain a decision
of impermissible coercion. 153
·
Whether a self -defense claim for coercion is honored should
depend, according to McDougal and Feliciano, upon the necessity
and proportionality of the defensive action. The element of necessity turns upon the relative power of the states in conflict, the nature
of their objectives, the importance of the values conserved and the
reasonablenes8 of the expectation of necessity. Proportionality, likewise, will be based on method, objectives, values conserved and
effects of the action.
McDougal and Feliciano summarize coercive actions which they
regard as "permissible." These fall into three categories.
The most important because of the high intensity of coercion
usually involved and concomitant general risk to nonparticipants,
are the self-defensive coercion against a third state, based on the
argument of continuing coercion by a principal opponent. Also less
critical are assertions of temporary limited authority upon the high
seas for defensive purposes. Such temporary limited authority
might be asserted in nuclear tests, satellite recoveries, or a "Quarantine."
(1963) Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 13, 14.
1sa McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 167-206
(1961).
152
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In a second category are low-level intensity, nonself•defense
coercive exchanges endemic in international relations.
Police measures applied by or under the authority of the organized
co1n1nunity of states are in a third category.
To these categories might be added a fourth, perhaps embraced by
McDougal and Feliciano \vithin their third category. Within this
fourth category are enforcement actions of an interim and stabilizing
nature taken by member states pending the decision of an appropriate international organization. Such enforcement would be in
voluntary discharge of the enforcer's obligations of membership.
Action of this type has been discussed in Chapter III, Situation 3.
This action may not be of a defensive nature. It bears an analogy
to the interim action of an equity court familiar in Anglo-American
law.
Included also might be various servicing functions involving
coercion, such as coercive gathering of evidence. This evidence might
be for consideration by an international organization dealing with
security matters 154 or for the use of a state decision maker faced
with a possible application of intense coercion.
a. ELEME1VTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN REVIEWING

DRAFT PROCLAMATION
Unlike an analysis of the Cuban Quarantine of 1962, which
can be undertaken with the advantage of hindsight, an analysis of
the Draft Proclamation (set forth in Situation 6) relating to naval
interdiction of biological munitions and facilities for their delivery
must be based upon certain assumptions concerning the nature of
the decisions necessary as the Proclamation is executed. How "reasonable," for example, will be applications of naval force in the
"zone of surveillance"?
A series of decisions will be involved-and any plan, no matter
how carefully considered, can be executed illegally by officers who
misunderstand or ignore it. In the Quarantine, the "persuasive"
impact of United States policy was enhanced by moderate applications of power coupled with efforts to obtain agreement with the
Soviet Union.
To the extent functions of "planning~' and "operation" were not

These actions, exemplified by the Anderson-Heyser U-2 sorties preceding
the Quarantine, should be distinguished from the British effort to obtain evidence to support the Corfu Channel claim before the World Court, a "nonemergency" action not considered as "legal" under the circumstances by the
Court. Corfu Channe~ Case, jl949/ I.C.J. Rep. 335 (1962).
1M
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performed by the President and his deputies, who maintained close
control over the quarantining naval units, the legal burden rested
principally upon the naval operator. Judicious use of law after the
basic plan was formulated had much to do with the satisfactory
result.
Assuming the Proclamation will be executed obediently and
diligently, what questions should be considered with a view to its
revision ? Stated in functional terms, the areas for appraisal in
which law plays a part are these:
( 1) Is the plan persuasive i The problem of persuasion will begin
with the President and will continue with the executive officers
who will execute the Proclamation, with the United States electorate,
our allies, officials of international organizations, and officials o:f
Scythia and Nueva. The "legitimacy" of an act is a product of
persuasion-since the collection of values and institutions we describe
as law are in a process constantly of reconstruction.
( 2) Does the plan provide adequate guidance for executive
officers who will carry it out? The President is responsible nationally
and internationally for establishing adequate guidelines and controls over administrative officials. Closely allied is the provision of
adequate legal safeguards against personal liability of these administrative officials in the performance o£ their duties. Suppose
a naval officer who executes the Proclamation falls into the hands
of Scythian authorities. Does the Proclamation provide a basis for
legal arguments in his defense?
( 3) Does the plan permit sufficient latitude of action for coordination of the United States economic thrust using naval force
with reciprocating action by Scythia or Nueva? Interference with
the shipment of biological munitions and means for their delivery
is economic warfare employed as a primary policy device. There is
no intention to overwhelm Scythia or Nueva by the use of armed
force.
This being so, it is in the interest of the United States to permit
Scythian and Nuevan officials to determine United States intentions
with clarity and to provide avenues of withdrawal to these officials

when withdrawals are consistent with United States policy. Ooordilnation, likewise, is closely related to persuasion, mentioned as
a first area of appraisal of the plan. These areas will now be considered in inverse order-roughly in the order o£ their importance.

0 oordination in the Proclamation
The most essential requirement for coordination in economic action
is action of a familiar and accustomed pattern. This enhances the
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likelihood of a rational response by the opponent along predictable
lines. Action to develop coordination is consistent with the concept of
an "economic sortie." An economic sortie is usually most effective
when the target anticipates the point of attack but for geographical
or other reasons cannot offer an effective defense.
The general plan of action in the Proclamation, just as the plan
of action in the Quarantine of 1962, follows the accustomed outline
of Pacific Blockade or "Pacific Contraband." Preferences seem
expressed for applications of naval force limited in diversity, limited
geographically, and limited in intensity. Scythia probably will not
imply from the Proclamation tacit directives for general attacks
upon Scythian vessels and supply lines.
While Scythia cannot assume the President will be able to maintain effective control over his executive officers under all circumstances, this control probably can be maintained as in past transactions of this type. These judgments by Scythian officials may
lead to a moderate rather than intense Scythian response.
The Proclamation also suggests the coordinating powers of the
United Nations are being invoked. Information will be collected to
enable the United Nations to perform this task by the use of commissions of inquiry or by use of other available~ agencies. The
International Red Cross was proposed as a fact-findBr to determine
removal of the missiles from Cuba. This organization might prove
acceptable to the United States, Nueva and Scythia, to investigate
the storage, experimentation with and use of biological weapons.
It may be assumed the United States will furnish information
concerning its activities and findings to the World Health Organization and the Pan American Health Organization as well as
to the Organization of American States to bring the influence of
these organizations to bear in shaping Scythian and N uevan
responses.
G'ltidance in the Proclamation
The Proclamation in Situation 6 shares with the Proclamation
issued in the Quarantine of 1962 minimum standards to guide
executive officers. An executive officer must expect to engage in
economic warfare under a plan assembled somewhat loosely by his
superiors.
The Proclamation in Situation 6, repeating the wording of the
Proclamation of 1962, directs the general method by which vessels
of any nationality may be intercepted and searched. It limits the
use of force to the extent necessary to secure compliance with the
directions of the President and the regulations and directions of
the Secretary of Defense.
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Unlike the Proclamation of 1962, the proposed Proclamation
provides for the diversion of vessels for visit and search to points
designated by the Secretary of Defense. This will relieve the
intercepting officers at sea from the burden and hazard of searching
for easily concealed and dangerous material. It will also permit an
investigation in port using impartial witnesses. The Proclamation
makes clear that the intercepted vessels are not to be seized as prize
but are to be released when biological munitions and equipment
found aboard are surrendered to the United States.
While the proposed Proclamation relieves officers at sea from the
necessity of action likely to stimulate conflict, it does not and
cannot contain directions for all situations arising. Allowance must
be made for : ( 1) lack of foresight by the policy maker ; ( 2) misinterpretation of instructions by the executive officer; and ( 3) the
development of emergencies permitting no time for instructions
by superiors.
There is no way in which an executive officer can be excluded
entirely as an effective decision maker. Facts are developed by an
executive officer determining the direction of a later course of
decisions by formal (legal) policy makers.
It is therefore desirable to develop, as an incident to any policy
such as that presented in the draft Proclamation, grounds for
projected legal defenses of the executive officers involved. The projected defenses, 'vhen kno,vn to the executive officer, serve indirectly
as a form of guidance by providing princi pies of action to fill the
interstices of the Proclamation and instructions issued thereunder.
The draft Proclamation provides desirable machinery by which
immediate judgments concerning the action of an executive officer
can be rendered. The institutional controls under which he functions
normally can provide these judgments in part and will exist no
matter what the Proclamation provides.
His naval superiors, for example, will appraise his action. His
awareness of the predelictions of these officers serves as an effective
guide.
The Proclamation also contemplates diversion of vessels· and
custody of prohibited materials by the United States under circumstances encouraging negotiation and the settlement of individual
cases by agreement. Perhaps naval claims boards can be established
to consider claims for economic loss occasioned by interceptions or
diversions and provide opportunities for formal decisions concerning the conduct of executive officers in which persons other than
naval decision makers can participate.
These formal contemporaneous decisions are desirable to protect
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the executive officer because t he facts reviewed will be substantially
those available to him. The interception of Trent by Captain Wilkes,
discussed earlier in this book/ 55 illustrates disadvantages arising
from failure to obtain immediate formal settlement of issues produced by naval interceptions.
To minimize the risk of exposure of an executive officer to delayed
prosecutions, it is desirable to develop in a "pacific blockade" or
"contraband" proclamation a basis for an argument for immunity
against prosecution for acts done pursuant to it. The act of state
doctrine has been argued unsuccessfully in cases of war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
The only basis of immunity which appears available for development is that of an international official. The immunity of an international official is based upon_agreement and not custom. 156
Hence it is desirable in the Proclamation to relate the pr oposed
action of the United States to action by the United Nations Or ganization. The Draft Proclamation does this in two ways. The Proclamation describes the action directed as of an interim n ature pending action by the Security Council or other organs of t he United
Nations to preserve peace. Also em ph a sized is the intelligence function of the naval action-the collection of information for p reliminary action by organs of the United Nations.
These interrelationships of United States policy with policies of
the United Nations and the Organization of American States are
discussed subsequently as they bear upon the element of persuasion
in the Proclamation. They can, however, be used also as the basis
for an argument for immunity of United States officers either under
Section 22 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations 157 or under the functional immunity provisions
of Article 105(2) 158 of the United Nations Charter.
The contention might be that the officer was a temporary official
of the Organization performing its functions. The same argument
can be offered if the officer acts pursuant to the instructions of a
Chapter I, Fn. 29, et seq.
See Hill, Immunities and Privileges of International Officials-The Experience of the League of Nations (1947).
1 57 See Yearbook of the United Nations, 100-103 (1946-47). Article 22 applies
to "Experts * * * performing missions for the United Nations * * *." This will
be the more difficult of the two provisions upon which to found an argument
of immunity.
158 Article 105(2) reads:
"Representatives of the Members of the United
Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges
and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions
in connection with the Organization."
155
156
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regional organization with peace enforcement functions subject to
the authority of the United Nations.
Several problems are evident: (1) Can an effective argument be
made that an officer acting as an "interim" functionary without
express authorization by the United Nations is an expert or official
of the Organization? (2) Will acts of a possible criminal nature be
held ultra vires and beyond the proper functions of a representative
of the Organization? (3) To what extent will immunity be recognized by an international tribunal or by the courts of a state not
a party to the convention or a nonmember of the United Nat ions?
( 4) Assuming functional immunity may be argued effectively under
Article 105(2) how long will this immunity continue? The immunity
based upon the Convention continues indefinitely. ( 5) Will the
Secretary General waive immunity under the Convention? He apparently cannot waive immunity under the functional provisions of
Article 105 ( 2) .159
Difficulties in developing immunity arguments to protect officers
causing injuries to persons or property while carrying out their
orders pursuant to the Proclamation are obvious. The Proclamation,
however, in view of experience with delayed criminal prosecutions
since World War II, should lay the foundations for immunity
arguments which might be offered.

Persuasion in the Proclamation

~

The most important feature of the Proclamation to which legal
considerations are relevant is its persuasive impact. The major difficulty is to distinguish "justification," which tends to be retrospective and subjective, from the prospective and objective persuasive
elements rendering legal institutions effective policy implements
and policy guides.
Differing concepts of law and of the requirements of a legal order,
as in all East-West conflicts, complicated the problem of persuasion
in the Quarantine of 1962. Because the problem of persuasion was
complicated, with many different audiences requiring different
approaches in argument, Western spokesmen tended to fall back
upon arguments urging the "necessity" and thus "justification" for
the arms interdiction.
159 Discussions of related issues may be found in Hill, Immunities and Privileges of Interrwtional 0 jficials-The Experience of the League of Nations, 58-75,
101-119 (1947) ; Kunz, "Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations," 41 A.J.I.L., 828 (1957) ; Preuss, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities
of Agents Invested with Functions of an International Interest," 25 A.J.I.L.,

694 (1931).
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b. SELF-DEFENSE A1VD OOLLEOTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

The legal basis of the Quarantine of 1962 preferred by most
commentators upon the subject appears to have been the necessity
of self-defense or collective self-defense. 160 As an abstract legal
proposition, it has been generally accepted that a state may resist
by employing force proportionate to an imminent threat to its
territorial integrity or political independence. Hn The decision to
employ force must be reasonable under the circumstances attending
the threat. Provisional or interirn decisions to use force for defensive
purposes seem admissible when the necessity is clear to the state
officials responsible for acting and the decision made and executed
conforms to the United Nations Charter.
The Draft Proclamation in Situation 6 suffers from the disadvantage that no Resolution of the Organization of American States
can be used to support it. Quite probably, if the policy expressed
in the Draft Proclamation is accepted by the President, efforts will
continue to secure the support of that Organization.
But since the naval action proposed is intended in part to produce intelligence which might induce the Organization to act, it
will be imprudent to delay action pending a resolution of support
by the Organization as was done in the Quarantine of 1962.
This difficulty 'viii limit the use of arguments such as those
advanced by officials of the State Department to support the
Quarantine.l 62 Required instead will be arguments to support
initially unilateral action by the United States.
The Executive Committee advising the President concerning the
Quarantine of 1962 was clearly persuaded to reach its judgment
and render its advice by factors in addition to law. This should
not obscure, ho,vever, the very significant function of law as an
institution for persuasion. To the extent law does become relevant in
decisions of this nature, in which values of a civilization are at
stake, the persuasive function of law is its dominant function. This
function dominates from the factual analysis and discussions preceding the authoritative or basic decision through the network of
decisions involved in its execution.
See Fns. 137-141, supra.
Eloquent expositions of the customary doctrine with supporting records of
practice may be found in Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law, 8-27
(1958) ; Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 251-79
(1963) ; McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 21732 (1961). See also Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 243-246
(1954) where the self-defense doctrine and its possible limitations by Article 51
of the United Nations Charter are considered.
162 See Fns. 140, 141 supra.
160
161
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At the basic policy-making level, :for example, when the President
makes his decision concerning the Draft Proclamation, the persuasive
£unction o£ law is confined in the main to legal analytical method
to be applied in selecting the appropriate means to attain the
desired end. This end is maximllm feasible preservation o£ the
physical and other values o£ people with whom the decision maker
identifies.
Acceptance o£ this end is coerced-both by formal allocations o£
responsibility in domestic constitutional provisions and by practical
allocations o£ power within the political system.
The identification also is coerced, although an identification
pattern is difficult to maintain due to diverse pressures upon the
decision maker. The effective end and the form,.al identification are
"nonnegotiable."
In a selection o£ meam the decision maker may be persuaded. It is
convenient at this level o£ policy making to persuade in a contraposed initiating coercion-self-defense context such as that set forth
by Professor McDougal and Dr. Feliciano. 163
The difficulty arises as the policy is carried into execution. In
this context, the arena in which legal processes o£ persuasion must
be employed is broadened. Thirty years ago the reactions o£ one's
allies, acquaintances and enemies could be disregarded in action o£
the type carried out in the Quarantine o£ 1962 and contemplated
in the Draft Proclamation. Today, favorable responses £rom the
officials o£ these states may determine the success or failure o£ limited
coercion.
Unhappily a paradox exists. The self-defense (or collective selfdefense) formulae, meaningful in a formulation o£ the basic policy
and in obtaining domestic support £or it, are less persuasive to
officials who consider themselves removed £rom the value dislocations
in the conflict or who consider their values so implicated that a
defense by the United States carries a direct physical threat to
them. The problem is one o£ perspective-sometimes o£ abstraction
or detachment-sometimes o£ involvement-but in each case an
egocentric reaction.
It was difficult, for example, for some of the leaders of new states
in the third or fourth rank o£ powers at the time o£ the Quarantine
to accept the un·willingness o£ the United States to rely solely upon
discussions before the United Nations to solve its problem o£
defense. I£ the United States, as its propaganda suggested, could
batter Cuba into a necklace o£ smoking and toxic lagoons lying
163

See McDougal and Feliciano, Law and j)finimum World Public Order

(1961).
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generally bet,veen the ]"'lorida Straits and the Wind 'vard Channel,
why provoke the Soviet Union by naval interference 'vith its shipping?
The value placed by the United States upon human lives and
the responsibility £or avoiding nuclear war 'vhich rested upon its
officials could not be appreciated fully by officials in other states
in ,vhich the 'veil-being o£ citizens beyond the official class 'vas not
a major value. These officials might view an enemy simply as an
object £or destruction. Their unverbalized concepts o£ "self-defense"
might be narrow.
The unverbalized concept o£ self-defense presents a special problem-varying some,vhat £rom culture to culture-depending upon
the concept o£ the "sel£." The unverbalized concept o£ self-defense
o£ the decision maker to be persuaded by legal "defense" arguments
might be appraised and his response harmonized with the goal
sought by a policy advocate by the play o£ relevant £acts within
his attention frame.
Where the unverbalized concepts o£ self-defense (the unstated
ethical limits imposed upon action to preserve life) are mutual,
defensive arguments are most effective. When Secretary Webster
presented his well-kno,vn, and embarrassingly narrow, argument
concerning permissible self-defense to Lord Ashburton in the
Oaroline, 164 he simply refurbished an argument with which he had
probably dealt in homicide cases as a trial lawyer a dozen times in
the courts o£ New Hampshire and Massachusetts. He could be
confident the British 'vould accept his formula because the idea was
derived £rom British common la,v. The differences that arose were in
applying the formula to the £acts.
It is easy £or the official unwilling to support a state offering a
sel£-de£ense argument to articulate reasons £or rejecting it on £actual
grounds. All viable states seek values. In this sense they act offensively. Any viable state 'viii maintain a positive or offensive front
against all out-groups 'vhile seeking (defensively) to minimize
internally the conflict this offensive action against out-groups
produces.
This does not mean that a state assumes the offensive with all
policies or that all offensive policies are coercive. No state com-

164 2 Moore, Digest, 217, at 412 (1906) : "Undoubtedly it is just, that, while
it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defense do
exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the 'necessity of
that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means
and no moment for deliberation'."
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mands the values permitting coercive offensive action along its
entire policy spectrum at any given time.
An active expenditure of values, the expenditure increasing with
emphasis upon coercion, must be supported by policies tending to
conserve values. Policies directed principally, although not necessarily exclusively, to the conservation of values, tend to be described
as defensive. Policies directed principally, although not necessarily
exclusively, to the acquisition or destruction of values possessed by
another state tend to be described as offensive.
When this descriptive framework is used, no state, even the most
la·wless in its international relations, can be said to act wholly
offensively or not in self-defense. To the unreceptive decision
maker, the self-defense argu1nent is a "rope of sand"-since this
decision maker can always point to offensive features in actions
primarily defensive. 165
I65 A matter also to be considered, but one not disturbingly pressing at the
present time, is the cyclic linkage of defense with virtue and offense with vice
which can be observed in the history of Western Europe and America. The
specialist in rectitude or other molders of opinion have at times put forward
coercive aspects of offense as a virtue when either the value position of the
actor is threatened or a goal to enhance that position attained effectively by
coercion is offered or defined.
The refurbishing of offensive action to develop a patina of respectability
affects profoundly the thinking of the masses these leaders influence. To cite
the experience of the Roman Church in Western Europe-the virtues of
defense or preservation of the status quo were preached as the Church struggled
to consolidate its hold on values inherited from the ancient Roman State. The
man of the medieval world was exhorted to bear his many afflictions, physical
and political, with grace and fortitude in the hope of a more congenial spiritual
future.
The rebel, the heretic, the challenger of convention-the "man on the offensive," found the doors of medieval society, dominated by the Church, closed
to him.
Faced by internal political division and under the pressure of secular rulers,
1he Church later sponsored or encouraged a series of crusades in which offensive
policies were dominant. The medieval misfits, the "men on the offensive," now
oftPn valued crusaders, found a temporary abode in the religious military
establishment. This same offensive power was later directed to the internal
ordering of the Church as the Crusades drew to a close with once valued
crusading orders, such as the Templars, coercively liquidated.
There may now be in the making a reorientation of American op1n10n concerning offensive action. The general acceptance and support of the Quarantine
of 1962 may be a manifestation of this changing viewpoint.
For over fifty years the people of the United States have enjoyed a preferred
value position. Not only has this preferred value position inculcated in the
electorate an abounding regard for the status quo, but mass communications,
driving home to Americans their not entirely explicable position upon an island
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This difficulty in the use of self-defense arguments in persuasion
to implement the execution of a policy such as that proposed in the
Draft Proclamation, suggests the need for coupling self-defense
arguments (which are most persuasive when directed to the basic
decision maker and the persons he represents) 'vith arguments
which appeal to "detached" or "involved" officials in other states.

Self-Defense and Collective Self-Defense Applied
to the Draft Proclamation
Analyzing the Draft Proclamation and the facts stated in Situation 6 in a "self-defense" perspective, assuming action by the United
States will be unilateral, and using the specific criteria related to
"necessity" and "proportionality" described by McDougal and
Feliciano,I 66 a stronger legal case can be made for the action contemplated in the Draft Proclamation than for the action conducted
in the Quarantine of 1962.
Little data is presented in S 'i tuation 6 concerning the power of
Scythia. Assuming Scythian po,ver is comparable to that of the
Soviet Union, and it has a thermonuclear as well as a biological
warfare capability, the necessity of United States ~action is urgent.
The proportion of its coercive response by naval force to the initiating. coercion by Scythia is reasonable. While the area of zone of
surveillance embraces Nueva, the naval action contemplated is against
Scythian provision of biological munitions and the means for their
delivery.
The action by the United States tends to conserve its values.
Specifically and immediately the major value sought is physical
of plenty amidst want, have stimulated guilt complexes of a type conducive
to defensive psychology.
There are signs of a growing restlessness. An interest in offensive action
increases as the value position of the United States in rectitude, respect,
affection, power and even wealth is eroded by the effective implementation of
demands in other areas of the world.
As specialists in violence, military and police, gain ascendency, the importance
of offensive military action, as contrasted with defensive-holding strategy, is
likely to be pro~oted. It is a fair assumption that if changes of this sort occur
both at the "grass roots" and also in influential political echelons, the changes
will be reflected also in nonmilitary judgments such as in voter or judicial
decisions concerning the "legality of offensive action."
A trend of this type occurred in France prior to World War I when the
offensive psychology, advocated in the military environment by Grandmaison
aud Foch, permeated beyond the military confines into French domestic
politics and foreign policy.
166 See :McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Nlinimum World Public Order
(1961).
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well-being of its citizens. Due to the difficulty of containing the
effects of biological ·weapons, demonstrated by Scythian experiments
at Farrago and the apparent N uevan attack upon Antioka, the United
States action has an incl1Jsi1-'e objective. The United States acts to
conserve the values of peoples in the Caribbean area and perhaps
an indefinite area beyond that designated for the operations of the
United States naval forces.
Values of Scythia are unaffected in any appreciable sense by the
United States action. The Scythian effort to extend its values,
particularly po·wer, may be frustrated by the United States action
contemplated. But existing Scythian values are not diminished.
The action may work to the advantage of inhabitants of Nueva
by limiting the introduction into that territory of biological weapons.
Although a biological attack by N uevan units might not cripple
the United States, in the sense that a thermonuclear attack could
destroy vital population and communication centers, the precise
impact of biological ·weapons cannot be estimated in advance. The
physical ·well-being of its citizens is a major value sought through
in the organization of any state. The obligation of a state to protect
this value from erosion by disease, and the network of mutual
obligations among states to limit the spread of communicable
diseases, have been recognized since the 17th century. The obligation
has been expressed in modern Sanitary Conventions since 1851.
The action contemplated by the United States is naval action
with an economic objective-interrupting a flo\v of offensive material
to and from Nueva. With a resort to pressure in diplomacy by
posing a threat of biological attack, Scythia has injected an element
of coercion ·which cannot be met in any effective sense without
countercoercion.
Sea police or quarantining forces, typically coast guard or customs
units, are used routinely in enforcing sanitary regulations. In this
instance the breach of sanitary regulations threatened is massive
and concerted. Using naval force on the high seas to me~t this
threat is the minimum exercise of a long settled and traditional
right and obligation to repel disease.
The action, furthermore, is similar to pacific blockade or "pacific
contraband.~' There is nothing deceptive in the interception of biological munitions and means for their delivery which might tend
to provoke a major Scythian counterstroke. The pattern of United
States action is settled and familiar-as was the naval interception
in the Cuban Quarantine of 1962.
Tight control can be maintained over the naval units. The ship
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and aircraft commanders ·will be familiar with international legal
doctrine pertaining to their duties.
Alternatives to the action contemplated are direct diplomatic
negotiations or negotiations through the U nited Nations. Attacks
also may be made upon the biological munitions depots in Nueva
or the tra,vlers by w·hich the munitions are delivered or both. These
attacks might be launched by Antiokan forces with United States
logistical support or by units of United States Strike Command.
If the latter forces are employed, an assault might be made by
airborne units upon the depots. This assault would have to be coupled
'vith neutralization of N uevan ar1ned forces in the area. The trawlers
can be destroyed by United States naval forces if necessary.
The difficulty of the Organization of American States in reaching
a decision concerning N uevan biological 'varfare suggests the limitations upon diplomatic negotiation under these circumstances. Probes
other than by reconnaissance aircraft are needed to furnish information upon 'vhich negotiations can proceed.
There is no indication that economic pressures, such as trade
restrictions, 'vill have appreciable effect upon Salvaje.
The use of direct armed violence against the tra 'v lers or against
the munitions depots might bring a similarly violent response from
Scythia. Such attacks by the United States are undesirable unless
an attack upon the United States is imminent.
Interference 'vith both the buildup of supplies of biological
munitions in Nueva and the deployment of delivery means is the
most effective means to lay the ground,vork for settlement of the
problem through negotiation. It is also the most moderate use of
force to attain this end. Such action by the United States is proportionate to the initiating coercion.
The reasonableness of the expectation of necessity by United States
decision makers will lend force to the persuasive element of law in
the situation. Has the basic decision maker (the President in this
case) considered and interrelated the facts bearing upon the confrontation? Will other decision makers conclude he has given the
proper emphasis to the proper facts? Or will they conclude he had
ignored or has not had access to facts which should have been considered? What deference has been given to legal institutions such
as treaties to which the United States is a party and the obligations
of international organizations of which the United States is a
member? An initial decision concerning the necessity of the action
by officials of a threatened state may be made; but this decision is
subject to reappraisal in a general community perspective by other
decision makers.
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The National Security Council has reviewed the Scythian threat
against a background of experimentation 'vith and active use of
biological weapons by Nueva and Scythia. Scythia may be subject
to no international legal obligation to refrain from the use of biological weapons in actual 'varfare or the deployment of delivery
means for diplomatic pressure. However, the use of these weapons,
which Scythia may contemplate, is in direct conflict with the demand
of the general community to limit the spread of disease .. Certainly,
Scythia and Nueva have violated their obligations under Article
2 ( 4) of the United Nations Charter by a threat of force against the
territorial integrity and political independence of the United States.
Sufficient facts provide the basis for an estimate that biological
weapons will be used by Scythia and Nueva against the United
States if an opportunity is afforded.

Article 51 of the United Nations Oharter
To 'vhat extent does Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
(1) limit the defensive action which may be taken by a decision
maker when the necessity is reasonably found to exist, or (2)
qualify the degree of necessity which the decision maker must find
before action is taken? T'vo approaches can be made in construing
Article 51.
The intention of the parties to the Charter at the time of ratifica.tion may be sought. Guides in the search for this intention may
include records of discussions as the Charter was prepared at
Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco and the 'vording of Article 51.
Most la,vyers and political scientists favor this traditional approach
in construing Article 51-although these commentators differ In
the context 'v hich they 'vill consider in determining intent.
Alternatively, in a manner alien to the normal legal method in
construing instruments, Article 51 can be construed to implement
the work of the kind of institution the United Nations has become
in the General Community. This current role is not one foreseen by
the original members. A functional construction places little emphasis upon the intention of the parties in 1945 and relies instead
upon the character of the current operations o£ the Organization.
Committee compromises and legislative statesmanship combined
to produce in Article 51 general state1nents of the initiating and
reciprocating coercion upon 'vhich the Article focused. The basic
limitation on the use of force, keyed to objectives or ends denied
·when sought by forceful means, 'vas established in Article 2 ( 4) of
the Charter.
Article 51 was introduced into the Dumbarton Oaks draft at
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San Francisco to accommodate the demands of states without permanent membership on the Security Council. These apprehended
embarrassment of their possible defensive measures by the veto.
They wished to insure their ability to rely upon regional security
arrangements such as those envisioned in the Act of Chapultepec 167
and the Pact of the Arab League. 168
In 1945 the form which these regional security arrangements or
nonregional alliances might take was speculative. Also no one could
know whether the Security Council would or would not measure
up to its peace preservation responsibilities. Consequently, ambiguity
in Article 51 was then and is now a positive virtue. It was a type
of shelter 'vhich would enable members to survive the wreckage of
the Organization if this in fact occurred.
Most of the difficulty arising under Article 51 as applied to the
United States action in the Cuban Quarantine of 1962 and as it might
be applied to the action contemplated in the Draft Proclamation
in Situation 6 derives from assumptions: ( 1) that all measures of
self-defense or collective self-defense are keyed to "armed attacks"
and (2) that "armed attack" has a limited or special meaning.
Professor Quincy Wright and several other commentators have
construed the words "armed attack" narrowly to exclude the prior
planning of an attack and the "threat" of force. 169 Until the armed
attack is "actual," presumably when missiles are launched and
armed forces are deployed and in rDotion, there can be no miUtary
response in self-defense or collective self-defense. Professor Wright
seems to conclude that defensive measures not involving military
action are permissible against threats of force less than armed
attack. 170
The usual legal approach to the interpretation of any treaty,
charter or statute, however, is that any word is "ambiguous." The
interpreter can look to an extent to the extrinsic circumstances to
find its meaning.
As stated by McDougal and Feliciano: 171
167
168

IX Hudson, International Legislation, 283 (1942-45) No. 647.
Ibid., 300, No. 650.

169 Wright, "The Cuban Quarantine," 57 A.J.I.L., 546 (1963) ; Wright, "The
Cuban Quarantine," (1963) Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 9; Standard, "The United
States Quarantine of Cuba and the Rule of Law," 49 A.B.A.J., 744 (1963). See
Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-D·E!fense in Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations," 41 A.J.I.L., 872 (1947) ; Nincic (Reply) in Schwarzenberger, "Report on Some Aspects of the Principle of Self-Defense in the Charter
of the United Nations" (International Law Association, 1958), 68.
170 Wright, "The Cuban Quarantine," 57 A.J.l.L., 546, 563 (1963).
171 1\fcDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 234
(1961).
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* * * /N/either Article 51 nor any other word :formula can
have, a part :from context, any single 'clear and unambiguous'
or 'popular, natural and ordinary meaning' that predetermines
decisions in infinitely varying particular controversies.
All the relevant variables o:f the particular context should be considered.
Nothing will be :found in the wording o:f Article 51 to indicate
with clarity the meaning o:f "armed attack" or the corollary inherent
right o:f individual or collective self-defense. Meanings assigned
to these categories in a particular context must be derived :from
other provisions o:f the Chart~er, :from events contemporaneous
with the drafting and ratification o:f the Charter, and :from supervening experience in interstate and international organizational
relationships to the time o:f interpretation.
It has been argued that Article 2 ( 4) o:f the Charter is an absolute
prohibition on the use o:f :force :for any purpose, that any use o:f
:force was to be authorized by the Organization, and that the right
o:f individual or collective self-defense is retained subject only to
the permissive ambit o:f action permitted in Article 51. By this view,
self-defense is now the exception, and its scope depends upon the
interpretation o:f Article 51. 172
This position is derived :from a misinterpretation o:f Article 2( 4).
This Article refers to initiating coercion-threats against the territorial integrity or political independence o:f a state or in a manner
inconsistent with the Purposes o:f the United Nations or action by
:force to attain these prohibited ends.
A basic prerequisite to continuation o:f the Organization, as o:f any
political group, is security o:f its members. This is expressed in
Article 1 (1) o:f the Charter. With a diminished right o:f individual
or collective self-defense, the security o:f members o:f the Organization would be jeopardized.
The point is clarified when the obligations o:f members versus
nonmembers o:f the Organization are considered. Article 2( 4) appears
to extend to a threat or use of :force against a nonmember. Article
51, on the other hand, does not apply to a nonmember; and it is
difficult to construct a theory upon which parties to the Charter
could limit the inherent right o:f self-defense o:f a nonmember.
In Article 35 (2) there is an implication that obligations o:f pacific
t72 See Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force By States, 272275 (1963) where the various arguments are spelled out in detail. Professor
Brownlie concludes at page 275, somewhat equivocally, that " * * * Article 51
is not subject to the customary law jof self-defense; and that, even if it were,
this customary right must be regarded in the light of state practice up to 1945."
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settlement are not binding upon nonmembers unless these are accepted in advance for the purpose of a particular dispute brought
before the Security Council. Could the draftsmen of the Charter
or the ratifying states have intended to discriminate against a
member by putting it to disadvantage in its security relations with
a nonmember?
Consider the current position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Communist China or West Germany. It seems generally conceded that by
the customary law under some circumstances there is an anticipatory
right of self-defense-the right of a "preemptive strike." A number
of commentators have argued stoutly that no such anticipatory right
exists under Article 51. 173 If these commentators are correct can
Article 51 be taken as the exclusive source of the "inherent" right
of self-defense of a member? An affirmative answer would seem to
derogate from a basic purpose of the Organization.
The rights of self-defense and collective self-defense of members
and nonmembers must be the same for the rational administration
of any system of peace enforcement. Members may agree to refrain
from initiating coercion, as they have done in Article 2 ( 4) while
no such obligation is sought to be imposed by the Charter upon
nonmembers.
Professor Bowett,I 74 McDougal and Feliciano,175 and others 176
consider a customary right of self-defense to exist apart :from
Article 51. Professor Stone appears to share this view, although he
doubts the existence of a collective self -defense doctrine as part of
the customary rule. 17 7
Indeed, differences as to the precise limits of the customary doctrine at any particular time complicate all interpretations of Article
51.178 Differences also exist as to the degree, if any, the provisions
of Article 51 qualify the customary rules.
Ibid., 275-278.
Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law, 184-185 (1958).
175 McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 232-241

173

174

(1961).
176 E.g., Goodhart, "The North Atlantic Treaty," j1951J Reoueil des Cours
(II) 187, 192; Seligman, "The Legality of the U.S. Quarantine Under the
United Nations Charter," 49 A..B.A..J., 142 (1962) ; Waldock, "The Regulation
of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law," jl952j
Recueil des Cours (II) 455, 496-498.
177 Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 243-246 (1954).
178 Professor Brownlie, for example, takes the position that if an international
legal custom of self-defense operates in conjunction with Article 51, this custom
must be that which existed in 1945 rather than that existing in 1920 or earlier.
Assuming clear distinctions can be made between elements of the custom at
these various dates, it is somewhat curious to consider that the operation of
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The records of preparatory work on the Charter concerning both
Article 51 179 and Article 2 ( 4) 180 indicate an intention to retain
the customary doctrine with no enhancement of the degree of necessity by the inclusion of Article 51. Furthermore, at the time of both
the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco discussions an "armed
attack" was generally understood as a process by which the initiative
was seized by violent physical power applied by air, land or sea
forces. The survival of the people attacked depended upon their
ability to seize the initiative by an armed counterattack.
World War II demonstrated repeatedly at the Maginot Line,
Bataan, Warsaw and Stalingrad that no defending force can hold
a point indefinitely under the fire of modern weapons.
The "armed counterattack" \vas the key link in the problem of
escalation-the major concern of the Security Council in preserving
peace.
No Charter authority was necessary to authorize establishment of
minefields or other obstacles to vessels, vehicles or personnel.
The likelihood is that the individual and collective measures
mentioned in Article 51 \vere armed attacks which could be mounted
only to counter an "armed attack." The customary principles of
individual and collective self-defense continued to operate as to
defensive measures, military or not, whether an armed attack was
made or not.
There remained to the member states a spectrum of coercive acts
to be applied for defense, whether military means were employed
or not. There is no basis £or an assumption that all defensive
measures are keyed in Article 51 to "armed attacks"; that a military
defensive response is by reason of its military aspect a defensive
measure keyed to armed attack; or that an armed attack "occurs"
only when missiles are launched or forces deployed and set in motion
against an enemy.
In reconciling Article 51 \vith action taken in the Quarantine of
1962 and the action proposed in the Draft Proclamation, it IS unany custom other than that considered to exist when the question requiring
interpretation of the Charter arises would be relevant. The current content
of the custom, the requirement of necessity and proportionality, for example,
is determined by contemporary weapons s;ystems, strategies, tensions and similar physical factors as well as by treaties in addition to the United Nations
Charter. See Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 275
(1963).
1 7912 U.N.C.I.O. 680-2; Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United Nations,
297-9 (2d Ed., 1949).
1so Report of Committee 1 to Commission I, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 446, 459; Verbatim
Minutes of Fifth Meeting of Commission I, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 202, 204,
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necessary to rely upon · a doctrine of anticipatory self-defense,
although this element of the self-defense doctrine would appear to
be preserved by Article 51 'vhen an armed attack is recognized as
a process (an interacting chain of events) rather than a single event.
Such a construction seems mandatory in an era of missile., nuclear
and biological warfare.
The naval action contemplated in the Draft Proclamation is not
an armed countBrattack. It is an application of power by military
means to limit a threat of force and permit the working of persuasive processes. The fact that an application of military power is
involved, far from infringing some unwritten prohibition in Article
51, insures instead close administrative control of the naval units
and a consciously proportionate response. Neither the doctrine of
necessity as relevant to the Draft Proclamation nor the naval means
for executing the plan appear to be modified by Article 51.
The amount of conflict which has arisen concerning Articles 2 ( 4)
and 51 and their bearing upon self-defense and collective selfdefense, suggests the weight of the burden resting upon lawyers
who seek to develop meanings from words using techniques applied
in the treatment of domestic commercial instrum~nts, statutes and
constitutions.
In the current and continuing state of flux in the power, efficiency
and influence of global and regional security institutions, one cannot
assume that canons or principles of construction (or even the
premises underlying construction) can be applied rationally under
conditions a pproaehing constitutional chaos in the international
arena.
It may be, for example, that the same techniques for construction should not be used for all articles of the U nitBd Nations
Charter. Those dealing with trusteeships and economic and social
problems might be treated differently from those dealing with
peace maintenance.
This is not in keeping with the well-settled approach that construction of a statute, treaty or charter should seek ilntent and that
the construction should be runitar1j-that is, the articles should be
construed to stand together, in relation to each other, and the same
principles of construction should be applied potentially to any
article.
The argument for casting aside traditional techniques in dealing
with the peace maintenance articles of the Charter is believed to
rest upon two conditions.
First, is the shift in the peace-protecting functions of the United
Nations from "policing" and "enforcement" to "rheostatic activity."
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The dominant peace preservation function, as understood in 1945,
has been implemented by the subsidiary function of "intensity reduction~' and not principally by the subsidiary functions of investigation, adjudication and enforcement. The latter three functions
are by no means unimportant, particularly in uncommitted areas
where efforts are made to avoid conflict among the major powers, as
in the Congo. But even in these cases it seems quite clear that enforcement action by the global organization in no way approaches the
potential efficiency of enforcement by a regional security organization in which a single powerful state may assume leadership.
A second condition is development of a skein of practice in almost
a half century of experience with international security organizations which furnishes a basis for an accurate judgment of the degree
of intensity in coercive exchanges which these international "rheostats~' can accommodate. The basic problem is one of escalation of
violence.
An element of myth inheres in discussions of escalation of violence
by apprehensive commentators upon the perils of nuclear armament.
Among major nuclear powers with modern military communications
and adequate control over their military striking forces, the chance
of an escalation of violence beyond a stage desired by the opposing
decision makers is approximately zero. A major armed strike by
one of these nuclear powers against the other, involving the delivery
of major conventional or nuclear demolitions, will be met by an
equally devastating response.
But the major problem involving escalation is presented among
powers of the second or third range--for example, between Red
China and India; Pakistan and India; the Arab States and Israel;
Algeria and Morocco; and Indonesia and Malaysia. It is among these
states that the significant peace enforcement problems of the United
Nations and regional security organizations presently arise and will
continue to arise in the foreseeable future.
A workable rough rule of thumb for permissible coercion under
the United Nations Charter involves two features:
(1) The first is an estimate of the concomitant ability of the
world organization and the supporting regional security organizations to diffract the physical features of the coercive exchange and
project the conflict on a verbal level. An accurate judgment can be
rendered on this point by a decision maker with even modest intelligence resources.
(2) The second is cooperation with the United Nations or regional
security organizations in moderating the intensity of coercive ex-
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changes and in altering the nature o£ the exchanges t o develop
persuasive features. Coercion is presumptively permissible when
the first feature is satisfied and impermissible when not. The action
following the decision to coerce, the second feature, is critical in
supporting or rebutting the presumption raised.
Articles 2( 4) and 51 when construed in the light o£ the functional
approach suggested, set maximum and minimum limits upon increases and decreases in permissible coercion. Implicit in the formula
is the proposition that reduction in the efficiency of the global and
relevant regional security organizations as "coercive rheostats" reduces the ambit o£ permissible coercion. Increases in the efficiency
of these organizations increase the permissive area for coercion.
Lewis Carroll would have been pleased with the idea o£ a municipal police system in which the gravity of crimes depended upon the
efficiency o£ the police. This would throw personal liberties in any
constitutional system into limbo--and confuse the police as well. I£
the police were weak, a parking ticket would be a heinous offense,
although nothing much would be done about it-with a Gestapo,
a murderer might be reprimanded.
With contemporary international security systems, however, we
no longer deal principally with police or with crimes until we reach
the "particularization" o£ law to the lower echelon decision maker.
Instead, at the higher operating levels we deal principally with
rheostats moderating coercion. An approach such as the one suggested, which would clearly create chaos in a well articulated legal
order, may create order under conditions approaching chaos.
The formula also embraces a tacit double standard. Given the
same degree o£ efficiency o£ the global and relevant regional organizations major nuclear powers will enjoy a greater range o£ permissive coercive practices than powers lacking the internal controls
to prevent an escalation o£ violence. This treatment, however, is no
more arbitrary than that current in some world circles. Violent
seizures by ex-colonies o£ the territories o£ colonial powers are
tolerated. Reprisals by the "losing" state are characterized as aggressions.
By the formula suggested a maximum limitation upon coercion
is set by Article 2 ( 4) o£ the United Nations Charter. Despite a
decrease in the efficiency o£ global and regional organizations, or
the operation of the double standard, force cannot be threatened
or used against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes o£ the
United Nations. Functionally, coercive exchanges meeting the test
o£ the first feature o£ the formula would appear to be "peaceful"
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means used as described in Article 2 ( 3) "in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice, are not endangered."
Despite an increase in the efficiency o£ these organizations, the
sel£-de£ense safeguard, individual or collective, in Article 51, permits
an adequate coercive reaction to meet an "armed attack."
Treatment o£ this sort does not, o£ course, eliminate the need £or
determining the meaning o£ "armed attack" in Article 51 when
responsive action o£ a high intensity o£ coercion exceeds the "rheostatic efficiency" o£ the global and regional security organizations.
The treatment simply resets the relevance o£ Articles 51 and 2 ( 4)
in the light o£ the currently dominant security £unction o£ the
world and regional bodies.
Using this approach in construing Articles 2 ( 4) and 51, the
coercive action in the Quarantine o£ 1962 was well within the
permissive range. The United Nations demonstrated its ability,
largely through the office o£ the Acting Secretary General, to mediate
the dispute and secure a resolution o£ the issues by persuasion. This
result was facilitated by the close cooperation o£ the United States
with the United Nations. Assuming moderation in executing the
policies expressed in the Draft Proclamation, the Draft also is
compatible with Articles 2(4) and 51.
The rule o£ thumb suggested places emphasis upon three o£ the
several criteria offered by McDougal and Feliciano in their characterization o£ "aggression" and "sel£-de£ense.~' These are the "inclusiveness" or "exclusiveness" o£ the objectives o£ the participants 181
and the willingness o£ the participants to accept community procedures £or the settlement o£ their differences, 182 both being emphasized in the second feature o£ the rule o£ thumb; and expectations about the effectiveness o£ community decisions, 183 emphasized
in the first £ea ture.
Because o£ the speed in the making o£ decisions usually required
to develop maximum coercive effect, a series o£ simple standards,
i£ these play down the ultraindividualistic element in self-defensealthough clearly falling short o£ a comprehensive analysis, may
serve as an effective guide at a high-policy level. Perhaps the coordinating funotions of the standards are superior to a more comprehensive statement o£ criteria in which multiple elements provide
greater latitude £or difference. With respect to decision makers who
believe themselves removed £rom the threat calling £or a coercive
181 McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Mininvum World Public Order, 182
(1961).
182 Ibid., 203.
1sa Ibid., 206.
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response, the pers1.w.sive function perhaps is performed more efficiently than when "self-defense is emphasized."

W H 0 and the Health Regulations
Apart from Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter,
the only treaty provisions bearing upon the legal "persuasiveness"
of the Proclamation policy are the WHO Health Regulations. 184
These Regulations are a unique treaty form.
The World Health Assembly, consisting of representatives of
members of the World Health Organization and meeting at regular
intervals, considers International Health Regulations drafted by an
appropriate body of WHO with the assistance of the Secretariat.
Upon adoption by the Health Assembly, the Regulations are notified
by the Director-General to the governments of the member states.
After the expiration of a fixed period, three months in Health
Regulations No. 2, now in force, the Regulations are binding upon
a state which does not reject or file reservations to them. No reservation offered is valid unless accepted by the World Health Assembly.
Current Health Regulations No. 2 have three salient features:
(1) The Regulations are aimed principally at a group of "quarantinable" diseases-plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox and typhus.
( 2) The quarantine measures set forth in the Regulations are the
mawhnum which a state may apply. (3) The administration of the
Regulations is decentralized to regional and national health administrations. 185
The Regulations have no specific security escape clause such as
may be found in GATT. The sanitary measures specified are to be
taken in the territory of the state which applied them. The Regulations state that sanitary measures shall be applied by a state to any
ship which passes through its territorial waters without calling at
a port or on the coast. 186 There is no provision authorizing interference with vessels on the high seas for sanitary reasons.
Article 28 permits the health authority of a state to prevent the
discharge or loading of cargoes or taking on food or water at a port
or airport by a vessel or aircraft which is infected by an epidemic
disease other than the "quarantinable" disease "in the case o£ an
emergency constituting a grave danger to public health." It is
possible that an argument of limited viability might be constructed
upon this Article for interceptions of vessels upon the high seas
1 84

WHO Official Records, No. 37_, p. 329 (1952).
See Berkov, The World Health Organization, A Study in Decentralized
International Administration (1957), passim.
186 Health Regulations No.2, Art. 32 (1).
185
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with a purpose of shore contact. The argument would be similar
to the "hovering" argument urged in cases of revenue and immigration enforcement.
The most satisfactory approach, however, is to argue the Regulations are developed to reconcile the demand for security and physical
well-being unimpaired by the quaran tin able diseases with the demand
for a free flow of commerce. Trawlers prepared to deliver contaminated aerosols from a range of 600 miles are not commercial
vessels within the purview of the Regulations or engaged on a
commercial mission. The Regulations do not contemplate intentional
initiations of epidemics; nor are mutants of quarantinable diseases
developed for the purpose of warfare the quarantinable diseases to
which the Regulations apply.
A self-defense exception seems readily implied in the Regulations
when the difficulty of detection of attack is as great as in biological
warfare and the opportunities are limited for successfully controlling epidemics produced by mutants once these epidemics are
initiated.
It is quite probable that the Health Regulations, instead of presenting an obstacle to the policy contemplated in the Draft Proclamation, can be used to supplement the measures initiated by the
United States in response to the Scythian and Nuevan threats.
Notices concerning intelligence gathered during the proposed interception should be furnished to the World Health Organization
pursuant to Part II of the Regulations. This epidemiological information will then be disseminated among the members.
Likewise, the World Health Organization may be used as a
source of intelligence to aid in determining Scythian and N uevan
intentions. If Nueva can be designated as an infected local area, the
quarantine provisions which then may be put into force against its
vessels and aircraft and supplement to a limited extent the naval
pressure exerted against shipments of biological weapons and the
means for their deli very.

Interim Action to Preserve the Status Quo
As a persuasive device to be offered in addition to arguments
keyed to self-defense or possibly collective self-defense, an argument
presenting the action as an interim status quo preserving technique
should be addressed to decision makers not involved directly in the
conflict but who possess the power to embarrass execution of the
United States policy. This argument has been developed in detail in
Chapter III (Situation 3).
The interim action contemplated is narrower than the "policing"
concept offered by Christal and Davis in their analysis of legal
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problems in the Quarantine of 1962. 187 The interim action suggested
is noncompetitive with the peace maintenance functions of the
United Nations and is progressively reduced as the influence of the
world organization is brought to bear.
The concept is one of a power implied in every political or legal
system-namely the use of force formally or informally organized
to forestall intensive coercion until an authoritative community
decision can be rendered. In this context, for example, the action
of the United States in Lebanon and in the Quarantine of 1962, in
both cases harmonized with the peace maintenance efforts of the
United Nations and contributing to that effort, compares favorably
with the Anglo-French action in Suez in 1956 during which Security
Council action was blocked by a British veto.
Applying the interim action concept to the Draft Proclamation,
the action taken will have to be keyed carefully to any action taken
by the United Nations. Information obtained in intercepting vessels
carrying biological weapons or equipment for their delivery will
have to be supplied promptly to the Security Council or the General
Assembly. The argument is one to be advanced as the Proclamation
is executed and its effectiveness will hinge upon the prudence and
moderation with which the policies of the Proclamation are carried
out.
The Draft Proclamation requires no revision and the President
may be advised to approve it.
187 Christo! and Davis, "Maritime Quarantine:
The Naval Interdiction of
Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba, 1962" 57 A.J.I.L., 525,
537-539 ( 1963) .

